Shahed-136 and beyond: Evolution of Russia’s drone warfare strategy

Political and military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko analyse this.

According to him Russia has made significant efforts not only to improve the tactics and specifications of the Shaheds but also to scale up their production. In August 2022, Russian occupation forces first deployed Iranian Shahed drones in Ukraine. Since then, the drones have undergone multiple upgrades in tactics and design, becoming one of the most common instruments of terror.

In 2022, 447 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones were used over a four-month period. In 2023, this number increased to 3,154, and by 2024, it skyrocketed to 10,961. This marks a nearly 3.5-fold increase compared to 2023!

However, starting in July-August 2024, Russia began actively using "Herbera" and "Parody" decoy drones alongside the Shahed-136. These drones accounted for at least half of the increase in drone usage observed in the second half of 2024. Despite this, the escalation in Shahed usage was undeniable. As of early 2025, Russian occupation forces have already used over 12,000 drones, including Shahed-136, "Herbera," and "Parody"—more than the total number used in 2024.

How Russia scaled Shahed-136 production

The localization of Shahed-136 production in Russia took place in the special economic zone of Alabuga in Tatarstan. The production officially launched in 2023, although it had been slow to scale up due to heavy reliance on Iranian component supplies. However, Russia has made efforts to replace several of these Iranian components with domestic alternatives, with varying degrees of success.

For example, in 2023, Russian manufacturers redesigned the Shahed-136 fuselage for improved durability using a honeycomb structure. They also began using Russian-made flight control units (B-101) and "Comet" navigation modules combined with the "B-105" satellite navigation block. Previously, these blocks were used in UAVs such as the "Orlan-10" and "Forpost-P." Despite these efforts, Russia remained dependent on Iranian supplies throughout 2023. 

However, Russia accumulated a significant stockpile of fuselages while waiting for its full dependency on Iran to be replaced with components from China. China provided large quantities of microelectronics and other necessary parts for Shahed-136 production.

By the time Russia had secured a stable supply of these components, it had stockpiled fuselages and created the conditions necessary to scale up production significantly.

A rational tool of terror

Beyond the localization of production, the rationale behind using and scaling the Shahed-136 lies in its cost-effectiveness compared to cruise or ballistic missiles. The cost of producing a single Shahed-136 in Russia is approximately $50,000. In contrast, the cost of a subsonic Kh-101 cruise missile is about $1.5 million.

In other words, for the price of one Kh-101 missile, Russia can produce 30 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones.

An interesting comparison also arises when considering the warhead power of these weapons. The Kh-101 missile carries a 400 kg warhead, while the Shahed-136 carries a 50 kg payload, with newer models carrying up to 90 kg!

This means that while the Kh-101’s warhead delivers 400 kg of destructive power, 30 Shahed-136 drones can deliver a combined total of between 1,500 kg and 2,700 kg. In practice, it would take only one or more surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to destroy a Kh-101, which is an economically justifiable expense. However, intercepting 30 Shahed-136 drones would be much less efficient unless SAMs were used in extreme cases.

Even if SAMs are not involved in intercepting Shaheds, the diversion of attention from air defenses and the resulting wear and tear on resources is significantly more detrimental than dealing with a single cruise missile. Therefore, the Shahed-136 is a much more cost-effective weapon for breaching air defenses and terrorizing Ukraine’s rear areas, exhausting air defense systems, and providing greater overall destructive power. 

Moreover, the launch of Kh-101 missiles relies on aging and costly strategic bombers like the Tu-95MS, making each flight expensive.

Similar cost-effectiveness comparisons can be made with other missiles, such as the 3M14 "Kalibr" ($1.25 million), the 9M723 Iskander missile ($2 million), and others. In every instance, the price-to-effectiveness ratio is always in favor of the Shahed-136.

For these reasons, Russia will continue to scale up both production and the intensity of its terror campaign against Ukraine using this weapon—saving more expensive missiles for stockpiling and relying on rational calculations.

• Aviation expert, member of the public council at the State Aviation Service, Bohdan Dolintse, notes the production of Russian attack drones is growing.