Russia's weapons: how to stop flow of components from Ukraine's partners

This means that Ukraine’s partner countries, through their technologies, are indirectly supporting Russia’s attacks on Ukraine.

While the presence of Chinese parts in Russian drones can still be explained, the use of optics, engines, and microelectronics from our allied countries is a clear sign of ineffective sanctions enforcement. And if previous sanctions are barely monitored, what’s the point of new packages?

“The lack of proper oversight is one of the main reasons Russia can still wage war. This primarily concerns technological exports: dual-use equipment, machinery, materials, and tools used by the Russian military industry. Lists of these items are public, well-known, and have been published multiple times.”

What can be done right now to prevent Russian weapons from gaining access to Western technologies:

1. Establish a body to monitor sanctions compliance. In the U.S., this is handled by the Treasury Department, but in the EU, no one currently performs this role. During the Cold War, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) maintained and regularly updated lists of strategic goods, set restrictions, and controlled exports. Part of the oversight could be assigned to banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions through financial monitoring. A new European body coordinating these measures would significantly increase the effectiveness of sanctions.

2. Identify countries that help circumvent technological sanctions and impose restrictions on them. This is not too complicated: simply compare the volumes of technological exports to these countries before 2022 and now. If there is an unusual increase, check whether it aligns with the production of finished goods. If not, implement export controls and quotas.

3. Monitor the export of every single product found in Russian missiles and drones. The EU already has tracking tools — for example, QR codes or other markings — used to track medicines from factory to patient. Similar controls could be applied to the supply of French optics, Czech engines, or Swiss controllers.

4. Screen all “new” buyers. If a newly established company in Central Asia orders a large batch of chips used in Russian weapons, it requires explanation. A lack of justification could be grounds to block supplies or impose sanctions.

Additionally, a system of penalties should be developed for anyone involved in circumventing sanctions, with secondary sanctions imposed and shipments violating EU rules seized.

This would significantly reduce the flow of Western components to Russia, and it’s far from certain that even China could fully replace them.

Source

About the author. Mykola Kniazhytskyi, journalist, Ukrainian MP.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog or column authors.