Russia, Belarus prepare for joint drills: is threat of new offensive on Kyiv real?

Military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko writes that this fall, Belarus is set to host large-scale joint military exercises with Russia under the banner of West-2025. While framed as routine drills within the Union State framework, these exercises raise serious concerns among Ukrainian military officials and international observers alike.

In a recent interview, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, warned that the drills could serve as a cover for a renewed invasion attempt toward Kyiv — mirroring the events of February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion from Belarusian territory under the guise of similar exercises.

How credible is the threat this time? And what would it take for Russia to once again mount an offensive against Ukraine from the north?

Kyiv remains a strategic obsession for the Kremlin

Despite suffering a humiliating failure during its 2022 advance on Kyiv, the Russian regime has not abandoned the idea of total control over Ukraine — and particularly, over its capital. For Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin’s military planners, Kyiv holds symbolic, political, and strategic importance.

Capturing Kyiv would allow Russia to attempt regime change and install a puppet government — a goal that, while unrealistic under current circumstances, continues to shape Kremlin rhetoric and planning. The resilience of Ukrainian leadership, especially President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision to remain in-country throughout the war, has only reinforced this objective in Russian eyes.

Echoes of 2022: Why West-2025 raises alarms

The structure and timing of the upcoming West-2025 exercises are strikingly similar to those conducted in early 2022. Then, under the pretense of the Union Resolve-2022 drills, Russia deployed tens of thousands of troops and equipment into Belarus. These forces would later spearhead the failed push toward Kyiv on February 24, 2022.

While military exercises are not uncommon, history has shown that Russia often uses such operations as a smokescreen for offensive preparations. This historical precedent makes the West-2025 drills impossible to ignore.

Current Russian troop presence in Belarus (as of April 2025)

At present, Russian military presence in Belarus is limited and primarily composed of support personnel rather than offensive combat units. The total force is estimated at under 2,000 personnel, distributed as follows:

• Baranovichi Radar Center & Vileyka Communications Node: ~1,450 personnel
• Airfields (Baranovichi, Zyabrovka, and Mozyr): ~530 personnel
• Military Prosecutors & Investigative Units: ~20 personnel
• Ammunition Depot near Osipovichi (Unit 42707): ~20 personnel
• Private Military Contractors (PMC Wagner): ~100 personnel

These are not frontline combat units. Most are involved in logistics, air defense, signals intelligence, or administrative tasks — not large-scale offensive operations.

Belarusian forces near the Ukrainian border

Belarusian troop activity along the Ukrainian border has also remained relatively static. Current deployments amount to roughly 3,000 troops, mostly special forces and airborne units:

• 383rd Battalion (38th Air Assault Brigade) – near Pinsk, Brest Region
• 5th Spetsnaz Brigade – in Ivanovo and Pribolovichi
• 317th Paratroop Battalion (103rd VDV Brigade) – in Lelchytsy, Bragin, Zyabrovka-2
• 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade – Zyabrovka
• 51st Artillery Brigade – Gomel

These forces are supported by a limited amount of heavy weaponry, including:

• ~30 tanks
• ~135 armored vehicles
• ~60 artillery systems
• ~10 MLRS units

This does not constitute a viable strike force capable of launching an invasion toward Kyiv.

Could the situation change? What would a real threat look like?

In 2022, Russia’s northern offensive involved approximately 40,000 troops, and even that failed to achieve its objectives. Notably, those units were among Russia’s best-trained and best-equipped — a far cry from today’s degraded and under-resourced forces.

If Russia intends to attempt a serious renewed offensive on Kyiv, it would need to assemble a strike force of 100,000–150,000 combat troops, with another 50,000 in reserve, for a total of 150,000–200,000 personnel.

At present, Russia lacks the manpower and logistical capacity to do this covertly or quickly.

Under what conditions could Russia build such a force?

There are two primary scenarios under which Russia could plausibly rebuild a northern invasion force:

1. A ceasefire or de facto operational pause — which could give Russia time (3–6 months) to regroup and redeploy forces. However, this remains politically and militarily unlikely.
2. Another round of mobilization — similar to the partial mobilization of fall 2022, which saw over 300,000 men conscripted under repressive measures. A new mobilization campaign, possibly open-ended, appears far more likely than any negotiated pause.

That said, the mobilization and movement of such large forces into Belarus cannot happen unnoticed. Rail traffic, satellite imagery, and intelligence assets would detect any large-scale Russian buildup well in advance.

Warning indicators: What to watch for

Certain troop levels would serve as key thresholds to gauge risk:

• <10,000 troops – low threat, routine deployments
• 15,000–20,000 troops – moderate concern, watch for infrastructure buildup
• 30,000–40,000+ troops – high alert; possible preparation for offensive operations

As of April 2025, none of these thresholds have been crossed, and there is no evidence of a developing invasion force in Belarus.

Conclusion: Stay alert, not alarmed

While the upcoming West-2025 exercises are a potential pretext for future Russian aggression, the current facts on the ground do not indicate imminent offensive action from Belarusian territory.

However, Ukraine and its allies must remain vigilant. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities will be crucial in detecting any shift in Russian posture. A sudden surge in troops, rail traffic, or equipment transfers would be impossible to conceal.

For now, constant monitoring and readiness remain the best tools to counter any surprises — because while the immediate risk is low, the intent from Moscow has never fully gone away.

• Defense Express analyst Serhiy Zgurets believes that due to battlefield transparency and the widespread use of UAVs on the front line, Russia is unable to conduct large-scale offensive operations.