Putin and Russia's perspective on "temporary ceasefire" and broader peace process

It has been quite clear, even to the Trump administration, that Putin is hardly ready to accept the end of the war on compromise terms right now, as evidenced by the frantic and insane pressure Trump and his team exerted on Ukraine, both before and after the Oval Office spat.

It is only because Ukraine refused to surrender to blackmail and rejected capitulation that, today — thanks to the joint efforts of Ukraine and its rational partners — Trump's attempts to force Ukraine into capitulation have stopped.

So, let me remind you of what could actually make Putin seek peace on certain terms:

1. The inability of the Russian army to continue the war and achieve any success. I think this is quite clear. I align most closely with the assessment, which suggests that this moment could realistically come in late 2025 or early 2026. Perhaps even earlier, but we have no solid reason to be overly optimistic. No, Putin doesn't care that his soldiers are fighting on donkeys — this isn’t the necessary level of exhaustion.

2. The economic situation in Russia. This is more complex. The system's balance has long been broken, with crises piling up (although Russia still maintains a significant portion of its revenue from China and India), and reserves are dwindling. But as long as the Kremlin doesn't perceive the situation as catastrophic, there’s little incentive to “exit” the war.

3. Domestic political stability. An immediate threat to the regime’s existence could result from a combination of the first two points, along with external pressure factors. This is generally very hard to predict.

4. International context. I don't believe that Trump can offer Putin an alternative to cooperation with China that would be profitable enough for the Russian dictator to buy into it and abandon his own goals. In other words, Putin’s decision to stop fighting can only be influenced by pressure that creates risks regarding the first three points.

These four factors must also be multiplied by the fundamental inability of dictators to adequately assess the situation, as well as the systematic "lies in reports." That’s right, the feedback system in Russia is far worse even compared to Ukraine’s.

So, for real negotiations to be possible (and the 30-day ceasefire, the “American proposal,” is aimed at this very purpose), we would have to believe that Putin understands his successes are temporary or that disaster is looming. It makes no sense for him to agree to a “short pause” against this background — unless, of course, he feels that catastrophe is imminent. Let me remind you, we are talking about a man who sent the Russian Guard to Kyiv to suppress protests after a quick victory in just three days.

Therefore, Putin is likely to stick to his old demands or, as Ukrainian political observer Notevskyi suggested, propose a six-month halt to the war (without peacekeepers or arms supplies to Ukraine) while insisting on holding elections. This would be an attempt to shift responsibility back onto Ukraine.

Over the next 3–6 months, the Kremlin will try to wait things out, hoping for further tensions between Washington and Kyiv, Brussels, or London — essentially banking on Trump continuing to weaken Atlantic unity. If the situation at the front and inside Russia remains relatively stable from the regime’s perspective, Putin will not agree to any conditions that require significant concessions.

Therefore, I advise all those hoping for “peace by Easter” or whenever Trump envisions it to focus instead on the principle of "If not in the Armed Forces, then for the Armed Forces." Rather than expecting Trump to push Putin into real negotiations, efforts should be directed toward strengthening Ukraine’s defense.

With the current U.S. administration, we must be prepared for a cycle of “blame Ukraine, then Russia, and repeat” rather than applying effective pressure on the aggressor.

I would be happy to be wrong. But it is unlikely.

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About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration and politics

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.