Inside Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant: risks Ukraine faces

Contents

1. What are the possible scenarios for future developments, and how might Russia exploit the dangerous facility under its occupation?
2. Why connecting the Zaporizhzhia NPP to Russian power grids is dangerous  
3. What advantages Ukraine has  

Espreso TV explains the potential threats posed by this type of nuclear terrorism from Russia and the possible scenarios for its development.

This material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that unites Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and aims to strengthen information support and analytical provision in the field of national security, defense, and geopolitics.

What are the possible scenarios for future developments, and how might Russia exploit the dangerous facility under its occupation?

First and foremost, experts began to assess the real risks when, since April 2025, the possibility of U.S. control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the prospects for Ukraine-U.S. cooperation on this issue became a practical matter. Several potential scenarios for future developments have since emerged.

Experts have primarily highlighted the increasing pressure on Ukraine from the leadership of the IAEA, including directly from its head, Rafael Grossi. The push for a "productive discussion" with Rosatom introduces additional nuclear and radiation risks.

Any cooperation with Russia on the Zaporizhzhia NPP, including even discussions, allows the Kremlin to buy time and avoid responsibility for the occupation of the nuclear facility, maintaining a tool for blackmail and bargaining.

Currently, four scenarios are being discussed:  

1. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is returned to Ukraine.  
2. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains under Russian control.  
3. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant operates in a combined Russian-Ukrainian power grid.  
4. (According to the proposal of the "Russian director of the Zaporizhzhia NPP" Chernychuk and the Russian Federation) Part of the NPP's power units work for Ukraine, and others for Russia, by splitting the 330 kV and 750 kV distribution systems into two parts: one connected to Ukraine, the other to the Russian power grid.

The last scenario is essentially a substitution of military-political problems with engineering solutions. This would only allow Russia to escalate further and expand its maneuvering space, hiding behind the facade of constructive proposals.

In the context of this Russian trap, experts emphasize that Ukraine has no control over the electrical substations and power lines that the Russians are attempting to restore and rebuild to supply the nuclear plant exclusively from Russia. The obligation not to strike Russian power networks grants Russia the opportunity to complete its planned works undisturbed, enabling it to independently supply the plant for its own purposes.

In the fourth scenario, Russia could immediately target and damage the 750 kV Dniprovska and 330 kV Ferrosplavna distribution devices on the left bank of the Dnipro River, through which Ukraine currently supplies the plant. This would then be presented to the world as "another violation of agreements" by Ukrainian forces. Following this, Russia would only need approval from the IAEA and the U.S. to continue its sanctioned connection to its systems in one of several ways.

Thus, the fourth proposal serves as a way to obscure Russia's responsibility for the loss of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Any scenario involving a new administrative entity, developed by or with Russia's participation, fully aligns with the Kremlin's interests.

Importantly, within the next two seasons of 2025, considering that the U.S. may become a mediator, Russia could achieve the following goals:  

• Fully connect the NPP to its own grid for its own needs, completing the construction of a dozen temporary lines, which could even be covered with nets against drones;  
• Destroy the division of power supply between the NPP and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant along the Dniprovska 750 kV and all 330 kV Ferrosplavna lines;  
• Obtain unconditional support and protection from the U.S. and the IAEA head for its efforts to supply the NPP from the Russian grid.

At the same time, even minimal restoration of Ukrainian control could weaken Russia's grip. Gaining access to the plant would reveal to the world the unfit condition of the power units and the systemic, destructive, and dangerous actions of Russia at the NPP, debunking the myths of IAEA head Grossi about the supposed professionalism of Rosatom and proving the looting by the terrorist state.

Why connecting the Zaporizhzhia NPP to Russian power grids is dangerous

The main reason for supplying the NPP from Russian power grids is political. It is an attempt to "prove" the inability of Ukrenergo (state-owned electricity transmission system operator of Ukraine) to reliably supply the NPP from the Ukrainian grid by de-energizing the Dniprovska and Ferrosplavna lines. Another reason is to gain full control over the NPP's own power supply and always blame Ukraine for any loss of power.

Experts also highlight the unprofessionalism of the current Russian staff at the plant, who would not be able to operate RBMK and VVER-440 reactors. These people came to "make easy money" without Rostekhnadzor permits to operate VVER-1000 and 1200 reactors in Russia, and without experience in China, India, Turkey, or Belarus. As a result, operating the NPP's generators for the Russian grid is a task beyond their capabilities, and during emergencies in "cold shutdown," they relied on Rosatom. Operating in "hot shutdown" is far too complex for these "professionals."

This is further complicated by poor technical condition, long-term chemical damage to steam generator tubes, a destroyed repair and maintenance system, and the loss of Ukrainian engineers and skilled repair staff.

Another possible scenario involves the handling of nuclear fuel. Due to a six-year ban on using new nuclear fuel, the Russians may eventually unload the last remaining fuel into the spent fuel pool. Experts note that, considering the visible boric acid buildup around the GA201 pit — the emergency boric acid reserve for the reactor containment safety systems — which the Russians are also preparing to repair, this method of storage is, in some ways, no worse than keeping the assemblies in the spent fuel pool. However, the cooling systems of the spent fuel pool cannot match the highly reliable and redundant cooling systems designed for the reactor core.

A major concern is that, according to Ukrainian experts, the IAEA may not currently have a specialist on-site with the required technical expertise to objectively assess the situation.

A critical risk linked to Russia’s full control over the NPP’s power supply is their ability to, without violating any agreements, bring a reactor from a "hot shutdown" into a critical state — reaching neutron power levels of up to 2% — within 7–8 hours. In such a scenario, Russia could once again resort to nuclear blackmail if it fails to achieve its military objectives.

Moreover, without external power, it is almost impossible to bring the reactor to a minimally controlled power level after such a transition.

For these reasons, connecting the NPP to Russian grids must not be allowed, as it would lead to the systematic destruction of the Dniprovska and Ferrosplavna substations and power lines.

What advantages does Ukraine have

To begin with, Ukraine still has the ability to cut off power to the nuclear power plant if there are suspicions that Russia has started operations to bring the reactor to a critical state and restore residual energy releases from one and a half to two years ago.

Ukraine can also contact G7 experts to politically persuade the Russian and IAEA leadership that the Zaporizhzhia NPP is not a tool for warfare and global blackmail.

A significant fact is that Ukraine has 23 days of emergency generator operation, and then another three weeks before damage to the reactor cores and spent fuel pools, not even counting mobile power and heat removal systems for the pools and reactor cores at extremely low residual energy releases. Therefore, wasting this time buffer is unwise and dangerous.

How can Ukraine succeed in this situation? Experts stress that, above all, it is necessary to prevent the NPP from being connected to Russian power grids for its own needs.

The state must ignore blackmail about de-energizing the plant and not react to simulated threats while it is under Russian occupation. In addition, all inaccessible supply routes from the Melitopol, Kakhovka, Dniprorudne substations, and 35 kV substations should be considered potential risk sources that the Russians could use as leverage.

In summary, the operation of the NPP at power before its liberation must be prevented, including by stopping discussions about six-year restrictions on nuclear fuel.

Importantly, experts say that the Russians will leave the plant in complete ruin, so Ukraine must be mentally prepared for this and have the technical means and time to demonstrate that any Russian manipulations are myths that only work in a vacuum of knowledge, disinformation, and engineering degradation.

All tasks for Ukraine’s Energoatom boil down to one: proactively prevent the reactor from being brought to a critical state and power.

Experts conclude that new facts and documentary evidence of Russian nuclear terrorism, along with the IAEA’s alleged concealment of these actions, have prompted Russia to take steps aimed at shifting the focus to Ukraine’s detriment. In doing so, Russia is attempting to create the illusion that it is actively fighting for nuclear safety.