Former German General warns: Russia’s use of nuclear weapons would trigger major geopolitical fallout

This is a critical story: Russia’s offensive strategy and the real reasons it refuses to engage in any peace talks, with or without mediation from President Trump. The Russians appear to be preparing for extremely serious, potentially dramatic developments this summer. In your view, where do things currently stand with negotiations? Are the Russians bluffing or are they genuinely gearing up for an even larger war?

First of all, I want to say that we stand with Ukraine and support Ukraine by all possible means. Putin, who is essentially accused of war crimes, continues his campaign against civilians. They are now attacking villages that have no infrastructure or military significance whatsoever. I believe Putin is trying to make progress not on the front lines, where he has not been very successful, but by terrorizing the Ukrainian public and its people.

Do you have any insight into what happened during the last meetings in Istanbul, when the Russians sent a delegation led by Medinsky, a figure with a notably low official rank? It seems they downgraded the level of negotiations, yet still managed to arrange a prisoner exchange. Do you think the Istanbul format will continue, and what demands might Russia include going forward?

The exchange of soldiers and prisoners of war is one story, and possibly it's a way for Mr. Putin to present himself as somewhat cooperative, suggesting that this could be a step toward a peaceful solution. But in my view, it has nothing to do with the continuation of his war, nor with the failure of the direct negotiations in Istanbul, which were supposed to focus on how to end the war. Instead, he delegated lower-ranking officials to those talks.

I would completely separate the exchange of prisoners of war from his actual willingness to continue or end the war, or to enter into peace negotiations or at least a long-term ceasefire.

It is clear that in order for the Russians to change their attitude toward the negotiation process, they would need to suffer extremely painful setbacks — for example, the defeat of a military grouping on the front line or the transfer of part of the war to the territory of the Russian Federation, particularly through the use of UAVs. It should also be noted that the Russians have not had any significant success in defending their military facilities. Accordingly, this raises the question of whether they have the necessary resources to continue waging war.

Talking about UAVs and drones, yes, some are more important than others, but overall they do not provide significant thrust or operational effectiveness. So far, drones have been used by both sides: by Russia primarily for terror, and by Ukraine to target military infrastructure and installations, which, under the rules of war, is permissible.

Such operations, however, require a massive effort to disrupt Russian military infrastructure and logistics. The goal is to cut off supply lines and, if possible, eliminate headquarters and command centers. These are complex and intensive actions that could take months.

On the other hand, and this is something we might discuss later, there is also the question of financial pressure that should be applied to Mr. Putin.

When we talk about long-range strikes, we are referring not only to drones but also to the signal sent by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who stated that there is agreement on the use of long-range weapons. During his election campaign, Merz also spoke about the possibility of transferring TAURUS missiles to Ukraine.

Naturally, the Kremlin responds hysterically to such signals, but the situation on the battlefield demands that we strengthen certain offensive capabilities in order to neutralise the enemy’s military targets. Everyone has witnessed how actively the enemy has been bombing our capital, the city of Kyiv, as well as other locations. We must therefore take measures to neutralise Russian military targets.

Okay, yes, the problem is certainly technical to begin with. President Zelensky announced, I believe just yesterday, that Ukraine is developing a jet-powered drone with a range of 700 kilometers, which is close to that of a missile.

It is not technically a missile, but from a technological standpoint, it brings us closer to a convergence between medium-range missiles and UAVs. That being said, retaliation strikes just because Mr. Putin attacks civilian infrastructure and terrorizes the population of Ukraine do not give Ukraine the right to target civilian infrastructure in return.

According to the rules of war, long-range weapons, and I personally support delivering Taurus missiles to Ukraine, should be used against critical military infrastructure. They should not be used for retaliation. I believe that would be the wrong approach.

What could be the situation with TAURUS missiles?

I can only say what I know, and I am not a weapons expert, but the Taurus missile, of course, has a couple of advantages over the SCALP and the Storm Shadow.

It has a larger range, of course. It also has many different navigation systems, both interdependent and independent, which makes it more or less resistant to electronic warfare. You can also program it for various targets in different ways.

So, it is quite a sophisticated weapon. This is what I can say so far based on what I know. It has superior qualities when compared with other weapons.

I would like to ask you about the current security situation on the European continent, as here in Ukraine, we are not entirely confident in the stability of American President Donald Trump. There is also concern regarding the security component, given that the entire European security architecture has been built around the implementation of Article 5 of the Euro-Atlantic Treaty. At this point, Putin is openly threatening Europe, and I have received certain signals from my European colleagues suggesting that there is growing doubt about the reliability of the United States should it become necessary to use force in response to a Russian military provocation against certain NATO member states in Europe. I am referring specifically to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and potentially Poland.

Difficult, and basically, more questions arise.

The first point is this: if Putin, in this situation, really tries to set even one foot on one square meter of NATO territory, the entire alliance will immediately invoke Article 5, and that includes the United States. There is no doubt about it. We know from NATO that this would be the case.

This would happen, and Putin knows that by all means NATO will defend every member state, whether small or large, whether located at the central front, in the south, or in the north. There is no doubt about it, and the United States will be part of that response.

What we have to keep in mind is that Europe has not truly received or acted on this message for decades. The question has been: what should Europe do, and how can it put more effort into defending itself to ease the burden on the United States?

In fact, more than five U.S. presidents have said that Europe must do significantly more to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

Unfortunately, it has taken the war in Ukraine for Europe to finally receive that message, and now efforts are being made to do more independently. That does not mean we no longer count on the United States to uphold Article 5, both now and in the future.

A friend of mine, a British military officer, told me that the United Kingdom would go to war in the event of a conventional military provocation against Estonia. Of course, he is not an official representative, but he does have some insight into the mood and thinking within his government. In your view, how strong and immediate would the military response be if the Russians were to carry out a military provocation or a direct attack on one of the Baltic states?

That is basically correct, of course. If he has said so, then he is right. I cannot comment, first because I am not in a position to do so, and second because I do not have the necessary information.

However, the plans for the defense of the alliance, both in Europe and in Canada and the United States, have been developed and are being actively exercised.

It is an integrated defense plan in which all NATO nations have their role in collective defense. There is also a dedicated force planning process, which means that all of NATO would be involved according to the established NATO plan.

​​A few days ago, The Economist published a high-profile article on the modernisation of unmanned attack systems. We understand that drones have fundamentally changed the nature of warfare, both on land and at sea. Naturally, the Russians are also rethinking their current approach to warfare and rearming accordingly. They are now deploying 100 combat vehicles equipped with approximately 90 kilograms of explosives.

Is there currently a clear understanding on the European continent that urgent action is required? After all, the Russian Federation is fully committed to a military course, and it is therefore necessary not only to revise strategic concepts but also to rearm and rapidly scale up production — including the development of certain modernised attack systems.

Yes, we got the message, and nearly all NATO nations are now shifting their efforts toward the rapid procurement of drones, not only for kinetic effects but also for electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and intelligence purposes.

There has been a major wake-up call in many countries, including Germany, regarding the urgent need to develop drones of both high quality and in large quantities. I believe our tactical and operational concepts need to be reviewed in this context.

That said, we do not yet know how long this drone-based approach will remain effective. We are already seeing the emergence of technology where drones fight other drones, and swarms of drones engage with other swarms. This suggests the rise of anti-drone warfare in the air. We will have to observe how this evolves.

But the key message is clear: we have understood the need, and we must act quickly and decisively.

In your opinion, what is the outlook for aviation when it comes to providing Ukraine with additional F-16 squadrons? Are there any real prospects for expanding Ukraine’s fleet of military aircraft?

I think yes, what we could not observe at the beginning of the war three years ago was the Ukrainian Air Force being able to strike deep into Russian territory with aviation, simply because they did not have the necessary assets.

The role of offensive counter-air assets like the F-16 or other fighter jets came too late, and by then, the drone war had already begun. I still see air campaigns as one pillar of modern operational warfare within the framework of multi-domain operations.

From my impression and based on what I have seen in the media, the West was too late in delivering aircraft and did not provide enough of them. Training also took considerable time. The West never really succeeded in equipping Ukraine with a proper, integrated air force. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and it could have made a difference by enabling deeper strikes into Russian territory.

But in my view, that only occurred in isolated cases, and only to a limited extent, which is deeply unfortunate.

What are the prospects for revitalising the Coalition of the Willing? British Prime Minister Starmer, President Macron, and Chancellor Merz have all made significant statements and sent strong signals.

Unfortunately, there is growing concern that the United States may not fully grasp the scale of the threat — or may even be misreading the direction in which events are unfolding. How active do you expect the members of the Coalition of the Willing to be going forward? For example, Poland has already stated that its soldiers will not participate in any peacekeeping or stabilisation mission in Ukraine.

This needs to be discussed in detail, and it is a conversation that may indeed be very critical. However, I believe that the political leaders of the coalition of the willing, as well as other nations, cannot avoid it. We must have a plan for what happens in the event of a ceasefire and who will be responsible for securing it.

I see the French, British, and German initiative as the front and spearhead of what the European Union and NATO should be doing. It is not just about these three heads of state acting alone, but rather about them sending a clear signal to the rest of the EU member states. I believe that is their intention.

If a ceasefire becomes a realistic possibility, then we must already have concrete plans and decisions in place about what actions to take and who will be responsible for ensuring its security. The OSCE, for example, tried to play this role a few years ago, but it was not successful. Therefore, there must be another approach and another actor prepared to take on that responsibility.

How do you assess the prospects for continued financial support for Ukraine? We understand that money is the fuel of war, and this applies both to sustaining our national budget and supporting the Armed Forces. We do not rule out the possibility that a major challenge could arise around the purchase of heavy weapons needed by Ukraine from the United States, funded with European money.

Just a few days ago, I had the honour of speaking with European Commissioner for Security and Space, Andrius Kubilius, who assured me that we can count on the European Union in terms of financial backing. But when it comes to the purchase of American weapons, will the Pentagon grant its approval and support, especially given that such decisions ultimately depend on President Trump?

Of course it is the decision of the United States whether or not to sell weapons to Ukraine. As a sovereign state, only the U.S. can make that decision. They have specific systems, and it is entirely up to them.

The other question is funding. As I understood from the security forum about two and a half weeks ago, which I attended, the Ukrainian defense industry is quite capable. In fact, it is potentially able to produce up to 50 percent more than it currently does. However, it lacks the necessary financial resources and access to dollars.

So the first priority is for the European Union, and possibly other NATO and partner nations, to provide Ukraine with the required financial means to purchase those weapons or to directly support Ukraine’s defense industry.

We also know that there is $300 billion in frozen Russian assets. At the moment, only the interest generated from that money is being used to support Ukraine. But there may soon be a decision by the G7 or by the G7 together with the EU to seize that money entirely and use it to support Ukraine.

Of course, we understand that there could be financial repercussions from Russia if this step is taken. But this decision needs to be made soon. Some countries are currently holding those frozen assets, and this will need to be discussed at the G7 and EU levels.

War is ultimately about people. Russia has shown that it is capable of expanding its mobilization capacity with the support of North Korea. Is there currently a clear vision for how Ukraine’s military could be strengthened in terms of personnel? Are there any alternative strategies being considered to attract and mobilize additional individuals to support the war effort within our own territory?

The key is to convince young people who are able to fight that they are defending democracy, that they are fighting for what is right, and for a just and democratic state. Financial incentives may play a role, but that alone is not enough.

It is also essential that the technology used by Ukraine be superior, in order to protect the lives of military personnel as much as possible. It is not just about the number of soldiers, but about having the technological edge that provides an advantage and safeguards those who serve.

If a soldier knows that they are protected, that medical services are functioning, and that they will be cared for, then they are more likely to say, “Okay, I will go and defend my country.”

I would like to ask you about the threats coming from Russia regarding the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russians have sent several signals in this regard — according to unofficial information, some of these signals were directed to Washington. During the operation to liberate the Kherson region, Russia threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons, and from time to time, it repeats these threats. One such demonstration was a strike on a Ukrainian city using the Oreshnik ballistic missile. 

Is there currently any serious consideration being given to an appropriate and coordinated response in the event that Russia resorts to the use of non-conventional weapons?

I think the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a real threat. It is a serious threat, primarily directed at the population of Ukraine, but it is also a signal to the West that he may be willing to escalate to that level. If he were to use such weapons, it would immediately change the situation on the ground and just as quickly, it would transform the global situation.

This nuclear threat is not only about the possible use of nuclear weapons themselves but also includes the threat against nuclear power plants. Putin appears to be using that too as a form of intimidation.

My personal view is that Putin will not go that far. If he does, he would be escalating into a realm of threat that he cannot control. He would not be able to manage the consequences because the entire world would turn against him immediately.

What is your assessment of the timing and level of Russia’s preparation for a prolonged war?

The Russians have been publicly declaring their readiness to fight for as long as 20 years. I am not sure whether this is mere bluff or psychological pressure, but there are a number of indicators that should reveal the true picture. I assume that Western intelligence agencies have analytical data collected from multiple sources regarding the actual state of the Russian economy and its military-industrial complex. Based on this kind of intelligence, how would you evaluate Russia’s real capacity and preparedness to sustain a war effort for two decades?

If the financial, political, and military support continues at its current pace, it is possible that this war will be prolonged.

What we need to do, and what we must come to terms with, is the necessity to convince Russia politically, financially, and through strength on the ground that continuing this war is pointless. There are also other approaches, for example encouraging Russian engineers to leave the country and seek opportunities elsewhere.

Internally, we should aim to persuade people within Russia, particularly those from regions outside the central power structures, to understand what Russia is doing not only against Ukraine but also against its own population. It needs to be a coordinated combination of all these efforts. Only then might we be able to bring the war to an end.

We have not yet discussed the influence of China, which is significant, and of course the role of the United States is of the highest importance in this context.