Can Russia capture Ukraine's Sumy region? Assessing Kursk grouping and real threat

On March 15, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the Russian army was preparing to invade Sumy region. The day before, the evacuation of local residents was announced in a number of border settlements. In this regard, a wave of conspiracy theories arose that after the “failure” of the Kursk operation, Ukraine allegedly “provoked” Russian troops and that is why they decided to take over Sumy region. Military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko looked into what was going on.

Background

"It’s baffling how people who witnessed Russia’s 2022 invasion through Sumy region can now claim that some Ukrainian operation is to blame for the latest escalation. What caused the invasion in 2022? Climate conditions? A full moon?" Kovalenko says.

The 2024 Kursk operation created a security buffer, neutralizing Russia’s ability to launch sabotage operations in the border zone for seven months. This buffer also prevented Russian army from repeating the kind of offensive seen in Kharkiv. Thanks to this, the threat of active combat in Sumy region was minimized.

Now, while the buffer zone in Russia’s Sudzha district (Kursk region) remains, the enemy is attempting to breach Sumy region. This is primarily for show—to demonstrate strength and follow political orders from the Kremlin, rather than an actual offensive with clear military objectives.

Assessing Russia's Kursk grouping

Currently, about 60,000 Russian troops are stationed in Kursk region. But is this enough for a full-scale offensive to capture an entire region—or even just Sumy, a major city?

For context, in 2022, Russian forces failed to capture Sumy or even encircle it, despite having better-equipped units (though in smaller numbers). Given the current state of Russian logistics, how exactly do they plan to storm Sumy?

A useful comparison is the Belgorod grouping in Kharkiv region. In May 2024, it launched an "epic" offensive that some feared would lead to the occupation of Kharkiv. 

"But I repeatedly debunked that notion, explaining that their forces were only capable of small-scale maneuvers in the gray zone. And that’s exactly what happened. Today, that same Belgorod grouping—55,000 troops strong—is bogged down in northern Kharkiv region, unable to reach even the small settlement of Lypsti, let alone break through Volchansk," Kovalenko underscored.

So, what about the Kursk grouping?

Most of it is concentrated near Sudzha, along the Plekhovo-Makhnovka-Zaoleshanka line, forming a potential frontline. However, Ukrainian forces continue to control part of Sudzha district as a buffer zone, complicating Russian efforts to assemble a strike force.

Capturing a major city like Sumy—three times the size of Avdiivka—would require significantly more troops. For reference, Russia deployed 80,000 troops in the battle for Avdiivka alone.

Moreover, along the entire border, both Russian and Ukrainian forces conduct regular sabotage operations. Defensive units are stationed to counter these incursions, further limiting the offensive potential of Russia’s Kursk grouping.

Realistically, with its current resources, Russian army can only operate in the gray zone. And that’s exactly what they’ve been attempting since late February—trying to secure positions near Novenke, just one kilometer from the Russian border.

Conclusion: more imitation than invasion

Yes, Russia’s actions may intensify in the coming weeks, but they lack the manpower and firepower to occupy Sumy region or the city itself. As long as the buffer zone in Sudzha district exists, Russian General Lapin will continue struggling to advance. Ukraine maintains full fire control over this area, making offensive operations exceedingly difficult for Russian forces.

That said, the enemy may attempt to stage a large-scale feint—an operation designed to appear like an invasion but without actual substance. This is likely the Kremlin’s real objective: not a genuine offensive, but an illusion of one, meant to deceive both uninformed audiences and certain Western policymakers who rely more on conspiracy theories than actual military intelligence.

• The controlled withdrawal from Sudzha was a calculated move to reposition forces, yet Russian propaganda falsely claims a major victory.