Ukraine on alert: Russia’s power reshuffle fuels hybrid threats in Moldova

Military and political observer Oleksandr Kovalenko shared his analysis, published by Obozrevatel.

Russia recently purged hybrid-strategy ideologists from Putin’s inner circle, including Dmitry Kozak, long-time overseer of the “people’s republics” and promoter of hybrid approaches instead of direct invasions.

This shift affects both politics and military matters, as Putin attended the Zapad-2025 exercises with General Andrey Mordvichev, "a modern Russian butcher" favoring brutal assault tactics, instead of Chief of Staff Valerii Gerasimov.

All of this indicates that countries of the former Soviet Union, which Russia previously targeted with hybrid scenarios, could soon become targets of forceful actions. One of the most vulnerable and at highest risk is Moldova.

Moldova — new battlefield

After the Transnistrian scenario, Russia aimed to absorb Moldova through hybrid means — without using direct force. But three decades of failed attempts to fully absorb the republic, the corruption of Russia and its Moldovan puppets have doomed this plan.

However, the Kremlin continued its plans for Moldova, using the potential of internal agents who had been developed with a long-term vision in mind. This was a classic hybrid scenario, overseen by Kozak’s “Moldovan Department.”

"But long-term strategies and gradual progress toward goals no longer satisfy Putin’s weak regime. He wants everything at once, without lengthy political games," the observer notes.

Military operation: real and perceived threats

Today, the Kremlin could carry out a forceful change of power in Moldova, relying solely on the internal potential of Transnistria.

This scenario could unfold amid pro-Russian protests in Chișinău, backed by Transnistrian armed groups led by Russian “peacekeepers” under the banner of “popular outrage at Maia Sandu’s rule.”

These forces pose no real threat to Ukraine's Odesa and the region. Ukraine’s rapid reaction units near Transnistria outweigh the region’s military resources, which today offer nothing new.

The military potential of Transnistria consists of two categories: the Russian contingent, with about 1,700 personnel, and the illegal armed formations of Transnistria, numbering around 7,500 fighters.

These forces are insufficient to invade Ukraine or seize Odesa, but they are enough to strike Moldova — by backing staged protests (possibly triggered by the Sept. 28 elections) and deploying Transnistrian force elements. Russia’s recent reshuffle of ideologues shows this threat is being readied, and pro-Russian actors in Moldova could soon combine protests with armed action from Transnistria.

Russia’s goals with such actions are less about invading Ukraine further and more about raising tensions along the Romanian border and in Ukrainian regions, not just Odesa.

The goal is not just controlling the republic, but creating a provocative exclave. If Moldova falls under Russian oversight, Ukraine must redeploy troops there, weakening its front-line capacity.

"For this reason, events in Moldova over the coming weeks should command Ukraine’s full attention — not only for informational awareness but also for national security," the observer concludes.