
Istanbul. Imitating negotiations. What is their true purpose?
After Ukraine's successful attacks on Russian strategic aircraft and other targets, many expected Russia to break off negotiations
However, they still go to Istanbul because they are interested in the illusion of a negotiation process. Ukraine genuinely wants adequate negotiations but understands that Russia will not agree to reasonable peace terms. Russia tries to show a certain spectator that no additional sanctions should be imposed against it.
Russia has no intention of ending the war on acceptable or compromise terms. Another "circus from Medinsky and company" with unacceptable conditions is expected, which Ukraine will reject and respond with its own proposals.
For Putin, the war is a “balance point” for his regime. Returning the economy to peaceful rails, demobilizing the military, converting production — these are risks. Regional elites, who have strengthened during the war (unlike the centralization in Ukraine, Russia’s regional clans and corporate elites have grown stronger and have private armies, while central control has weakened), will have to be controlled.
The illusion of an external enemy is comfortable for preserving Putin’s regime, though in the long term it plants a bomb under Russia. To exit the war, Putin needs an obvious victory that outweighs the negative consequences, or a new war (but Russia is unlikely to be able to fight multiple wars simultaneously). Starting the war was risky, and exiting it is very difficult because a new balance has already formed.
The impact of sanctions and Ukrainian strikes on Russia. Putin will simulate the process because it is critically important for him that "Trump" does not impose new sanctions. The Russian economy is exhausted; additional sanctions (especially on buyers of Russian resources) could seriously weaken it. Yesterday’s strikes on the "nuclear triad" were unprecedented. Russia cannot quickly restore the production of these aircraft because it will take decades. This is a serious psychological blow to Russia as it proves that the myth of Russia’s endless resources and its ability to fight forever (which lives in Trump’s mind and is fueled by Russia) is a fabrication.
If the Russians present inadequate terms (and they will), they will look less confident. This will bring closer the introduction of new sanctions against Russia, which American senators, Trump’s circle, and Europeans talk about.
Ukraine has two key strategic tasks:
№ 1. Continue to tighten the noose of vulnerability around the Russians. Russia is vulnerable — it can be pressured — it becomes more vulnerable — it can be hit harder.
№ 2. Prove that Putin is not capable of negotiation and that Russia is a completely vulnerable country. Ukraine acts according to the norms of war, Russia responds with attacks on civilians. Russian threats ("we will retaliate," "you will see what we can do") no longer work — we have seen it all. Russia has already committed all possible war crimes and cannot do anything fundamentally new to increase pressure on Ukraine. And using nuclear weapons has too many external restrictions.
The two goals aimed at in the negotiations are to continue showing that only force works on the Russians and that Ukraine is ready to negotiate but from a position of adequate worldview, which the Russians do not have.
The best outcome of the negotiations today is a prisoner exchange. A normal and expected result — agreeing to continue negotiations, scheduling a new meeting; statements that the Russians are delaying the process.
What next? The Russians will continue their summer-autumn offensive. Ukraine will stick to its strategy — exchanging a minimum of territory for the maximum Russian military resource. Announced tools to pressure Russia (sanctions) must be implemented. If "Trump" and others really want to stop the killings, they must deprive Russia of the ability to commit them. The trends for Russia are negative. Additional sanctions or military aid to Ukraine could accelerate these trends.
Real negotiations will happen when Putin feels that continuing the war is a greater risk to his regime than ending it. Or when the regime falls. The Ukrainian delegation, Europeans, the UK, Turkey, and most Americans understand this. It remains to convince Trump and his circle.
About the author: Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration, and politics
The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog authors.
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