How Ukraine’s Energia plant strike mirrors WWII targeting dilemma faced by allied forces

Defense Express reported the information.

On May 23, Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Energia plant in Yelets, Lipetsk region. Days earlier, on May 21, they hit the Bolkhov Semiconductor Device Plant in Oryol, and earlier in May, attacks were carried out on the Strela and Kremniy El plants in the Bryansk region.

These facilities don’t produce finished weapons but supply crucial electronics. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence, Energia manufactures chemical power sources for the UPKMs — guidance kits used in Russian aerial glide bombs.

This is a strategic use of Ukraine’s limited capabilities. Striking the final assembly plant — such as the one in Korolyov near Moscow — is far less feasible due to its scale and the heavy protection of Moscow’s air and missile defenses. In contrast, smaller, less protected plants that supply critical parts offer realistic targets with meaningful impact.

This approach echoes a key WWII dilemma: whether to target finished weapons factories or the component suppliers behind them. U.S. intelligence in the war favored hitting bearing factories, essential to nearly all military machinery. A prime example is the decision to bomb the Kugelfischer plant, which produced 22% of Germany’s bearings, instead of the more famous Messerschmitt aircraft factory.

However, the execution of this strategy faltered. The Schweinfurt–Regensburg raids in 1943, known as Double Strike, aimed at bearing plants but suffered heavy losses due to a lack of fighter escorts. The first raid destroyed 34% of German bearing capacity, forcing Berlin to scramble for foreign supplies. But the second strike had little effect, as the Germans had adapted quickly.

While postwar Soviet narratives often claimed the Allies focused mainly on bearings, the reality was that these operations were rare and seen as failures by U.S. commanders. The British favored city bombing instead. Even Albert Speer later admitted the Allies missed a vital opportunity — had they pressed this strategy, it could have forced Germany into peace negotiations by late 1943.

Today, Ukraine faces similar trade-offs but with far fewer options. Targeting component suppliers is a pragmatic move, driven by what’s realistically within reach.