EU can use Ukraine’s experience to deter future Russian aggression, defense commissioner says

I would like to begin our conversation with the ReArm Europe programme and ask you about strategising with substantial financial resources.

The ReArm Europe program is very important not only for Europe but also for our support to Ukraine. It consists of several components. One of them is the so-called safe loans, the regulation for which will soon be adopted by the Council. In fact, I came to this interview directly from the Council meeting where it was discussed. These are attractive loans because they are backed by the European Union budget.

Member states will be able to use them together with Ukraine to procure equipment produced by the Ukrainian defense industry for Ukraine’s needs.

Other instruments such as the possibility for member states to increase their national defense spending by 1.5% without it being included in the calculation of the national deficit are also important. Altogether this will allow the European Union to increase defense spending by an additional €800 billion over the next four years, a truly substantial amount.

And what about the logic behind using these funds, given that the EU has one set of production capacities and the US another? To what extent will it be feasible to effectively allocate European funds for the purchase of American weapons to meet Ukraine’s needs?

First of all, we want these funds to be used to strengthen the European defense industry, which we understand faces many challenges. But what is also very important is that the regulation on safe loans will allow the procurement of defense equipment produced by the Ukrainian defense industry, and in this way, the Ukrainian defense industry is placed on equal footing with the European one.

What the Ukrainian government and industry have managed to achieve during the last three years of war is truly remarkable. The Ukrainian defense industry has increased its production capacity from €1 billion in 2022 to €35 billion this year.

A 35-fold increase in production capacity is really impressive. We understand that in order to support Ukraine more effectively, it is very important that European member states use their own funds or safe loans to procure weapons from Ukraine that are needed for Ukraine’s defense.

Of course, there may be some weapon systems that are not produced by the Ukrainian or European defense industries. In such cases, we will need to find ways to procure those weapons from other countries, including possibly the United States. But for the time being, we are focusing on how to increase our support to Ukraine by providing it with sufficient financial resources to achieve our main goal – strengthening Ukraine in such a way that the Peace Formula becomes truly possible to implement.

I would like to ask about the medium-term outlook for developments on the Eurasian continent. We have seen meetings between Xi Jinping and Putin, as well as agreements signed between Russia and Iran. North Korea has also been supplying military support to the Russian aggressor. All of this must be taken into account when planning additional weapons production – perhaps not only for Ukraine, but for the European Union as well. Has the European Union’s perception of a potentially doubled or even tripled threat begun to shift?

We see global trend development tendencies, and in the longer term, I keep repeating that we must anticipate the rising military power of China. This will require more and more mitigation efforts from the United States, which is likely to begin shifting its military resources increasingly toward the Indo-Pacific region. That, in turn, may result in a diminished American presence on the European continent, meaning the European Union will need to take responsibility for European security and defense on its own shoulders.

For that reason, it is crucial that we strengthen our support for Ukraine immediately. We cannot allow other authoritarian countries such as Iran, North Korea, or even China to get the impression that the West is weak or incapable of supporting Ukraine at a level that would allow it to prevail. This is something the West must do. If those authoritarian countries conclude that the West is weak, they will become much more aggressive. That would create additional problems not only for us in Europe but also for the United States.

Second, we must keep in mind that when the time comes for Europe to take responsibility for its own security in the mid-term perspective, we will need to discuss and design a new European security architecture.

In that context, I cannot imagine this new European security architecture without Ukraine being fully integrated into it. Ukraine has and will continue to have the strongest military force in Europe, a battle-tested army with a highly advanced defense industry, which some experts recognize as the most innovative in the world.

For the European Union, Ukraine becoming part of our Union, part of our family, and part of this new security architecture will be a crucial factor that allows us to feel significantly stronger in facing today’s security challenges.

I cannot predict the policies of the new American president, Donald Trump, but there are growing concerns in several European countries, especially in the east. Is there already a sense of how to respond and how quickly action might be needed if Russia attempts to open a so-called second front? When it comes to Putin’s ultimatum, which he first voiced over three years ago, we must not forget that he demanded the Euro-Atlantic community retreat to its 1997 to 2004 borders. In other words, Putin continues to repeat and revive the same ultimatum.

Putin can issue whatever ultimatums he wants, but the Western community, especially the European community, will never accept such ultimatums.

In general, I see the situation in Russia as quite tragic, because the trajectory of its development is clearly declining. Russia has excluded itself from the global community, particularly the global economic system, and its long-term prospects are quite negative.

From this point of view, I am absolutely sure that in the longer-term future, Russia will be forced to undergo deep internal changes. Putin is trying to prevent these natural developments, as democratic tendencies in this post-imperial space are gradually moving from the west to the east.

One of the reasons he started the war against Ukraine was to stop Ukraine’s progress toward becoming a successful European country.

Putin understood very well that Ukraine’s success could inspire ordinary Russian citizens to question their own authorities – asking why Ukraine is moving forward while Russia remains far behind.

So I would not take any ultimatums from Putin as something we should fear. On the contrary, they show that Putin himself understands Russia’s deep weaknesses. That is why he is trying to act aggressively, making bold statements to distract from the real direction of Russia’s development.

Do you get the sense that the Kremlin is now open to pursuing some form of diplomatic resolution to its aggression against Ukraine and the potential threat it poses to other European states? Or is it solely focused on expanding its military intervention and escalating conventional warfare?

For the time being, I do not see that Putin is genuinely ready for real diplomatic negotiations or for a just and lasting peace. He is playing games, delaying, and constantly inventing new ways to shift the blame for the failure of a ceasefire onto Ukraine, which is very clear.

What happens next will depend largely on Europe, on Western leadership, and especially on European leadership.

Recently, we have seen a form of collective leadership from several key European figures, such as Macron from France, Friedrich Merz from Germany, and Starmer from the United Kingdom. They have started to speak to Putin in strong language, demanding that he agree to a ceasefire.

If European leaders continue in this direction, we will see how willing Putin is to continue playing the same games he once played with President Trump, even mocking or trolling him with his statements and behavior.

Looking ahead, we must take seriously the forecasts publicly presented by various intelligence services from EU member states, such as the German and Danish intelligence services, which predict that Russia could be ready to test NATO or launch new aggression against EU or NATO member states within the next three to five years.

To prevent that scenario, we need to urgently strengthen our defense capabilities – by scaling up our defense industry and by learning from Ukraine’s defense experience and achievements. That is what we are trying to do.

It is very encouraging that President Macron, Chancellor Merz, and Prime Minister Starmer are showing strong leadership. However, leaders like Orban, Fico, and Vučić continue to signal their readiness to undermine what is often referred to as Europe’s united front on Russian aggression against Ukraine. Are there likely to be any consequences or decisions taken in the near future regarding the actions of the Hungarian and Slovak prime ministers?

That is a well-known problem and I am absolutely sure that the European Union will find a way to overcome, for example, Viktor Orban’s veto on Ukraine’s path toward European integration.

Second, we need to recognize that despite all the populist rhetoric we hear, statements against the European Union and even those that seem to favor Russian policies, there are still important developments to note.

For example, Hungary has requested permission from the European Commission to increase its defense spending by 1.5%. This indicates that Hungary wants to strengthen its defense capabilities. The question is simple: against what threats are they trying to reinforce their defense?

It appears they also understand that Russian threats could be very dangerous, not only for the Baltic States or Poland, but perhaps even for Hungary or Slovakia. So we are aware of how they are behaving, and we will certainly find ways to overcome the problems they may try to create for us and for Ukraine. Because we understand very clearly that the future of Europe and the only way forward to strengthen our shared defense capabilities is to move together with Ukraine.

Mr Commissioner, I would like to clarify whether there is any clear understanding of how to respond and how quickly we would need to act in the event of a Russian military provocation against the Baltic States or other NATO member countries, especially considering the uncertainty surrounding Washington’s stance six months from now. Putin continues to send hostile and aggressive signals toward the Baltic region through his proxies, targeting Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and potentially Finland. 

Well, we definitely need to take the possibility of Russian aggression seriously, not because of what Putin or his advisers are saying, but because of what our intelligence services are reporting. They are making very serious predictions that Russia could be ready for such actions before the end of this decade.

That is why, for the first time, the European Union has a Commissioner for Defence and Space. I have the responsibility to lead this effort, which shows that the European Union truly understands the scale of the threats we are facing in terms of our security and defense.

Everyone understands that the first targets of possible Russian aggression could be neighboring countries – Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and possibly even Hungary, Slovakia, or Romania. We cannot say for certain at this moment.

That is why the European Union is not only increasing overall defense spending and creating opportunities for member states to invest more in their own defense, but also developing very practical plans to strengthen the defense of our eastern border. This includes the so-called Eastern Border Defense Shield, which involves not only physical fortifications but also a shield of drones along the border.

We are learning a lot from Ukraine’s experience, and I am confident that we will be able to deter any kind of Russian attack.

General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and now Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has stated that the next war could be fundamentally different, requiring a deep understanding of developments on the battlefield. This calls for adjustments to the operational plans of general staffs, making it primarily a matter for the military. But is there even a think tank within the European Union that, in cooperation with the military, could design a new European security architecture that takes into account potential challenges in communication with Washington?

First of all, we shall see how our relations with transatlantic partners develop in the near future.

I believe that on both sides there is enough rational understanding of the threats we face and how we need to respond to them. Of course, we also need to consider the longer-term perspective, where we must understand that the United States may shift more and more toward the Indo-Pacific. But we should see this as a natural evolution of the new geopolitical reality and not be upset with the Americans because of it. Instead, we must focus all our efforts on preparing ourselves to take full responsibility.

This will take time, but we need to have clear plans in place. Second, we must learn a great deal from Ukraine. What General Zaluzhny is saying is absolutely essential for us to understand: how future wars will look. We must be ready not for the wars of yesterday, but for the wars of tomorrow.

Ukraine has vital expertise and valuable know-how, both through its battle-tested soldiers and its unique understanding of how to build an army of drones. This is the knowledge we are ready to integrate into our future plans.

That is exactly what we are working on together with NATO and Ukraine. NATO is currently defining new defense plans and new capability targets for member states, outlining how they must increase their readiness for defense. This is an ongoing process.

Looking to the future, when we will have to take full responsibility for European defense, we will also need to establish a new security architecture, with Ukraine as an essential and fully integrated part of it.

I would like to ask you about the European Union’s foreign and security policy in light of China’s growing influence. Reflecting on the recent conversation between Putin and Xi Jinping, they spoke of a so-called steel partnership, which I find somewhat concerning. At the same time, China does not issue overtly aggressive signals but rather emphasizes sovereignty and mutual respect. How do you view the current state of EU-China relations? And what role do you think China might be planning to play in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and potentially against Europe?

Understanding China’s global policy is not easy. Many things are changing, and it is difficult to predict how relations between China and the United States will develop.

We have seen many debates in the United States about China’s rising military power, but now we have also seen a clear agreement between Chinese authorities and the American administration on tariffs. So we shall see.

Predicting China’s geopolitical direction is also challenging. So far, we have observed most of China’s activities concentrated in the Pacific region. That region is far from us, but of course, we are concerned about global stability. Our position has been clearly defined by the European Parliament and the Council.

We are concerned about the human rights situation in China, about Chinese threats toward Taiwan, and other related issues. So we shall see. It is truly difficult to predict. We hope that the Chinese leadership will act in a responsible and prudent way and will not create another center of global tension. That is what we would like to see.