This war will not even come close to resembling the Russian-Ukrainian war. It will not have long front lines, but rather air strikes and sabotage. But even so, this war will distract from Ukraine, and that's bad.
It is difficult to predict the intensity and frequency of these strikes and sabotage. Much will depend on the outcome of Iran's current attack on Israel, on the long-term capabilities of Israeli air defense, and even on the political atmosphere within Israel. For its part, the United States will make efforts to ensure that this exchange of strikes does not occur, or is much less frequent.
The war will change the electoral discourse in the United States. Isolation from the world will no longer be fashionable there.
This undermines the foundations of Trumpism, but simultaneously, it will compel Trump to emphasize his "strong point" to the world—positioning himself as a geopolitical macho capable of restoring order through an assertive American policy.
This gives the US a chance to gain greater ideological support for helping Ukraine. However, it will complicate procedural support if aid to Israel and Ukraine is permanently separated into different bills. At the same time, in the context of the new media discourse - the confrontation between the "free world" and the "axis of evil" - Ukraine will receive a semantic bonus.
If the war escalates, a special topic may emerge: nuclear confrontation. Israel has long hinted that it has nuclear weapons, and Iran has long hinted that it could quickly develop them. Therefore, threats, demonstrations, and other power plays (in extreme cases, even tests) between "almost" nuclear countries are also possible.
About the author. Serhiy Taran, political scientist.
The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.