Escalation of Russia–Azerbaijan relations: empire is collapsing, but not Russia

But I would not reduce everything solely to geopolitical goals. As is often the case, a whole symbiosis of diverse objectives set by different officials at various levels arises.

Therefore, it is worth trying to find answers to the question of what the causes of all the recent events are, and these causes exist on different levels.

So, possible reasons:

1. The beginning of all this is the Kremlin’s unwillingness to recognize the new geopolitical realities and accept that they have lost (at least for now) influence in Azerbaijan. The Kremlin is not ready to acknowledge the “new realities on the ground.” Everything happening now is part of the process of the empire’s collapse. In this particular case, four factors acted as catalysts:

• The war in Ukraine (Russia’s inability to achieve success);
• Russia’s moral defeat in Iran and Syria (Moscow is not fighting for or defending its satellites);
• Russia’s betrayal of Armenia in the Karabakh war (in Baku and Ankara, this war is seen not as an agreement with Russia, but as Moscow’s weakness, since the Kremlin was simply unprepared for a new war in the Caucasus, especially one against Turkey);
• Putin should have simply apologized to the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev for the downed plane, but he chose escalation instead (returning to the point that the Kremlin is not ready to accept the “realities on the ground”).

2. It is possible that, unlike Armenians and Georgians, the Azerbaijani diaspora refused to play the anti-Aliyev game. This could explain the current pressure. If that is the case, this pressure may also be driven by a desire not only to punish the diaspora but also to create problems within Azerbaijan due to dissatisfaction among Russian Azerbaijanis. Note the parallel processes in Armenia, where Pashinyan acted proactively by sidelining his Ivanishvili and began seriously purging the so-called Karabakh clan, which in recent years had been very pro-Russian. But returning to Azerbaijan, it should be noted that, under any circumstances, attempts to strike inside the country by oppressing the diaspora are foolish and definitely counterproductive for the Russians.

3. The redistribution of markets across Russia, where Azerbaijanis and, more broadly, people from the Caucasus hold a large share of bazaars. This might also be seen in the context of intimidating other ethnic minorities, although so far there have been no noticeable anti-state movements among any minorities, and they were generally willing to play the games understood by the authorities.

However, intimidation may be needed in the context of property redistribution, although Putin has different interests being sold to him. Let me remind everyone that a massive re-privatization is underway in Russia, in which the prosecutor’s office and the FSB play key roles. Coordinated processes at the top can have a completely spontaneous nature at the local level.

4. It is still difficult to say whether there is a broader geopolitical context related to the war in Iran and the complications for Russia in the southern corridor (a key economic project of India) and the middle energy corridor (Asia to Europe bypassing Russia). However, the escalation has undoubtedly created the preconditions for this geopolitical game. The fact is that resolving all problems without Ankara is already de facto impossible. But turning to Ankara also means that the Kremlin cannot solve any issues in the post-Soviet space without a third party.

5. How long the acute phase of the conflict will last is hard to say. Baku and Ankara are currently playing escalation, understanding that time is on their side. Equally important, in this game, Ankara is not only focused on the Caucasus: it is effectively addressing the Turkic countries of Central Asia, urging them to stop playing with Russia. We (the Turks), together with China, can protect your (elite) interests and your countries more effectively than the Russians.

6. There is much talk about the collapse of Russia with future maps. Unfortunately, there will be no collapse of Russia in the near future. But everything happening now in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Armenia is the second stage of the empire’s collapse (the first was in 1991). Empires almost never fall in an instant. They have certain revanches (2014 — Crimea; 2024-25 — the final, but also temporary, restoration of control over Georgia). The upcoming months will see very important elections in Moldova. However, the processes triggered by the war in Ukraine are irreversible for the empire.

7. And finally, I want to draw your attention to a little-noticed detail in this whole story: internal politics (regarding the Azerbaijani pogroms) and the political advancement of Russia in the post-Soviet space are overseen by one of our smartest enemies — Sergey Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of Putin’s administration. If he fails in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and especially Moldova, his standing may decline. That would be one of the best outcomes for us.

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About the author. Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.