After negotiations: When can we expect 500% tariff on Russian goods?

1. Everything that’s happened in recent weeks has been a show for one viewer. Putin did everything he could to avoid triggering Trump’s rage. The Europeans, meanwhile, backed Trump into a corner, hoping he’d finally snap. Some Republicans seem to have sided with the Europeans. But Trump didn’t snap. So now we’re entering the second act of this one-man play.

2. What will this act look like? Putin will again push the line that "Ukraine and the EU are sabotaging the talks." At the same time, through Dmitriev’s channels, Russia will keep offering juicy economic deals (and if we leave conspiracy theories aside, these deals, already worth billions, are probably the main reason Trump hasn’t "snapped").

3. The Europeans seem set to continue their previous tactic of luring Trump into a trap. Let me remind you again: none of Dmitriev’s proposals work without the EU’s approval. And Europe won’t consider giving anything to Russia until the U.S. tariff issue, NATO security in Europe, and the Ukraine issue are all addressed.

The only difference in Europe’s second-act strategy may be the Vatican’s growing interest in playing a bigger role. This could mean more activity in the U.S. along this channel.

4. The Lindsey Graham act, which might move forward as a parallel track outside the White House’s main line, faces two big problems. Pushing this bill without first securing deals in the Middle East would stall U.S.-China talks and damage ties with India — both key buyers of Russian oil. So it’s worth watching how (or if) talks go between the U.S. and India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel — especially with the Iran nuclear deal hanging in the background. But even if everything moves in the best-case direction, the earliest this law could come into effect is late 2025. Meanwhile, keep an eye on Trump’s approval ratings and how they track with views on Russia and Putin. If Trump’s numbers fall, the White House may have to act more boldly.

5. I want to stop for a moment on that "sensational" Bloomberg story claiming Putin is obsessed with a summer offensive and thinks he can break through, even though military experts don’t understand his optimism. I’ve been saying this for months, but Western analysts are still missing three key reasons why Putin wants the war to keep going:

• His regime depends on a motivated minority (up to a third of the population) that wants Ukraine wiped out. If the war stops, many of them may switch to the real opposition. The Kremlin has no idea how to handle that.
• The Kremlin’s domestic political bloc is just starting to build a system to control veterans returning from the front — not just through the FSB and Interior Ministry, but also using the veterans themselves. This fall, they’ll test the idea of "every tenth MP being a veteran" during the single voting day. After that, the system will need fine-tuning. Kiriyenko and his team don’t look ready to start bringing people back before spring 2026. And that’s just one piece of the peace-prep puzzle.
• Russia has launched the largest nationalization and reprivatization drive since 1917. The six main beneficiaries (Chemezov, Kiriyenko, Kovalchuk, Rotenberg, Sechin, Patrushev) are already well-positioned, with about ten more families in the second tier. Ending the war would slow that down. And I’m sure Putin’s inner circle is doing everything it can to make sure the war keeps going.

As for what’s next: I still believe the next real negotiating window won’t open before the end of 2025. And I don’t rule out the possibility that China could join the talks, possibly as part of a broader U.S.–EU–China negotiation triangle.

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About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.