U.S. cannot resolve security crisis without Europe — Lithuanian Seimas Vice Speaker Auštrevičius

I would like to ask you to comment on what happened in Riyadh. We only know the official, public part, but there are extremely disturbing and worrying signals, particularly from Mr. Witkoff. After all, a part of the American political establishment sees Russia not as an enemy to be deterred, but as a partner and perhaps even a friend. How do you assess the talks in Riyadh?

I completely share your concerns when it comes to the meetings and negotiations taking place in Saudi Arabia.  

I can't believe what I hear and see from the spot at those negotiations. Well, my take is that the Russians are using these talks and meetings simply to impose new demands, kind of an ultimatum, every time, and they are not moving towards any peace agreement.  

They're just extracting something else from the USA every time. And unfortunately, what I hear from US representatives is that they’ve started to adopt very Russian arguments, even bringing them into the public discourse. But it's clear that these are not US interests.  

These are the demands of the Russian Federation. So that's why I think we are in a rather complicated situation. Instead of, along with Ukraine, having a unified stance in negotiations and indeed pushing the Russians to accept a reasonable and absolutely justified position, the US is taking Russian arguments and trying, you know, to slightly push and demand from Ukraine as well as from the West. The latest we heard from Saudi Arabia is that the Russians demanded the export of agricultural products and fertilizers, which is absolutely unacceptable. It's just one more demand, and the USA is simply backtracking and accepting Russian ultimatums.

The situation is not just alarming, but dramatically complex. Unfortunately, we don’t know whether the Americans currently have what’s called a long-term strategy, including negotiations with Russia. However, we in Ukraine are deeply concerned about the potential consequences. What can we expect in the short and medium term? The Russians have rejected any compromise proposals and are fighting for every inch of the territory they’ve seized. Moreover, they are planning to occupy additional territories they haven’t even captured yet. The Russians have made their threatening position painfully clear.

In fact, you are completely right. The Russian Federation hasn't changed. I mean, if you compare the Russian position and demands, ultimatums from, let's say, February 22, and those from March 25, I see very little change, if any. They are simply taking the old demands and ultimatums and adding new ones. For example, regarding membership in NATO and other organizations, they have no intention to compromise. So it's absolutely clear.  

I can't understand the negotiating position of the United States of America. I don't think they fail to see it, but maybe they have some negotiating tactics or ideas that are completely unclear to me, and I don't think this is a road to success, frankly speaking.  

If the US is ready to negotiate with Putin at the expense of Ukraine, it is definitely an absolutely bad strategy, an unacceptable strategy. These are not negotiations; they are simply giving up ground and the interests of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

Do you have any understanding of what Donald Trump is doing? Does he not grasp certain things, or, unfortunately, does he understand very well what he’s doing? And here we’re talking not just about Ukraine, but also about Canada, about relations with Denmark, with the EU, and how they actually prevented the EU’s official representative, Kaja Kallas, from participating in the relevant discussions. Do you think Trump understands what he aims to achieve?

Unfortunately, this is the latter kind of alternative view, and you made it clear. I think the Trump administration has a full understanding of tactics as well as the principles of building a new global order. Well, I mean, it's a somewhat shaken global order because it is based neither on multilateralism nor on the clear principles that the West was so insistent on pushing forward some time ago.  

That's why we see a somewhat fragmented picture. We see less confidence among Western partners, and we see no predictability in the decisions and proposals coming from the Trump administration. That's why it is a bit risky while at the same time not bringing clarity.  I mean, what can be achieved for the collective West? Because I don't think the USA can succeed without involving Western partners and Ukraine in solving the very complex security situation we are facing now.

I would like to ask you about the perceived threat to individual EU countries. We often hear information and warnings from political scientists and heads of certain intelligence agencies. We understand that aggression against Lithuania or Estonia is possible, but it can only be triggered if Article 5 of the Euro-Atlantic Treaty is called into question. The important thing is that the true allies of Lithuania, Estonia, and Ukraine are prepared to back each other up, possibly in a critical situation. But when they talk about 2030, I don’t believe it, because Putin is ready now. The only safeguard is Article 5 of the Euro-Atlantic Treaty, which Trump might interpret in a way similar to how he interpreted relations with Canada.

Well, we have to admit that there is no alternative to a collective defense alliance like NATO. I do not suggest we should create something to replace it. I have no intention of questioning Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is absolutely clear: "All for one and one for all." That is the principle on which we have built our security expectations and capabilities.

When it comes to the Baltic countries, they stand, let us say, on the eastern frontier of Western civilization in this regard. The good news is that we have increasingly effective and partnership based cooperation with our Nordic neighbors, as well as with Poland, Germany, and others.

I want to particularly acknowledge the recent decisions made in Berlin. This represents a strong return by Germany to European security matters, with increased investments, commitment, and even a much improved philosophical approach.

Therefore, even if some NATO members might have doubts about Article 5, I am confident there are others who have not forgotten, who have not changed, and who remain fully committed to it. We are not pursuing national solutions in this regard. We base our security on collective defense, and we believe that we will contribute, and others will contribute, to our security if the need arises.

The key issue is to ensure that any mechanism is equipped with the readiness to use force to stop the aggressor, along with the necessary military strength. This requires further reflection from European states, not just financially, but also in terms of their willingness to invest in additional defense production. The US is too unpredictable, and Ukraine has heard quite positive signals from the EU. However, we’ve also seen some setbacks when it comes to concrete plans and actions, not just words. How do you assess the EU’s preparations to repel aggression? This is an existential question because Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland remain on the Kremlin's blacklist.

We have no illusions about any better developments in the Russian Federation. In fact, Russia has chosen war as an instrument for constructing international relations, particularly with its neighboring countries.  

We are facing a very dangerous and tense situation on our borders. As you know, we share a 700 km border with Belarus, and Belarus is a full accomplice of the Russian Federation. I would probably describe Belarus as occupied in a hybrid way – not necessarily fully occupied, but under the full control of the Russian Federation. That's why we take this situation very seriously.  

Additionally, we have Kaliningrad (or Königsberg), which is part of the Russian Federation and is, by the way, a very militarized area. For a long time, especially over the past 10 to 15 years, the Russians have been building more and more fortifications and increasing their military presence in Königsberg. Many Western capitals probably overlooked what was going on there, but things are as they are.  

Taking all this into consideration, I can tell you that we have no doubts that we need to demonstrate our own commitment by increasing investments in defense and doing so jointly with our neighbors, in coordination and through joint actions. This includes military exercises, exchanging experience, and by the way, we are very grateful to Ukrainian military and political experts. We have gained so many important insights from recent military operations, and we are learning a lot. We are closely following the situation on the front lines to learn as much as possible because we are witnessing absolutely new warfare, with different military means being applied in completely new ways.  

So, our commitment is clear: financial investment, cooperation with neighbors, NATO, and EU partners. But this is just the beginning – it's not enough, I can tell you. We are currently spending 4% of GDP on defense, which is not enough. We are talking about 6%, but this must be equally accepted by all EU and NATO member states. Only then will the collective defense alliance be strong enough. 

For many decades, the collective defense alliance – NATO, and to a certain degree, the EU – has been in a very unprivileged situation.  

That's why it's important to set a good example, as we see from the Baltic States, Poland, and the Nordic countries. Just recently, I saw that Sweden has decided to increase its defense spending by almost 50%, from 2.4% to 3.5% by 2030. But time is not on our side. We need to speed up and do much more than we are doing now.  

You mentioned Kaliningrad, Königsberg, and Krulevets. We understand that this will be an extremely important issue for Lithuania, Poland, and Germany. I believe the Russian Federation sees this as a potential point of aggression. After all, we remember how World War II began: Hitler started talking about the extraterritoriality of the Danzig or Gdansk corridor. We understand how crucial the Suwałki Gap is. It’s known that there is a closed military unit there, but are steps being taken at the political level to develop a proper response plan in case of a provocation in Suwałki?

Absolutely. I'll bring to your attention probably two latest developments in this regard. Lithuania has already denounced the so-called Dublin Convention, which is about cluster munitions. Along with the Baltic States and Poland, we also made the decision to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, which deals with anti-personnel mines.

These two new developments show that we are actively seeking the defense capabilities and means we need in order to build and strengthen our borders, and to do everything possible in any potential crisis situation.

In this regard, our borders are being strengthened. I can tell you that even some bridges leading to the Königsberg region are completely blocked by special installations. There is no movement for the time being, and there will be none until the situation changes.

On our border, particularly with Belarus, we are constructing various defense installations and taking this very seriously.

Personally, I don't expect something very traditional, like a military provocation, but there could be some hybrid and different kinds of provocations, even from the Lukashenko regime, which is completely dependent on Putin.

That's why these areas of our territory are under close scrutiny. I can tell you that territorial defense forces are conducting military exercises to familiarize themselves with these special locations. This is not a joke. The society as a whole is taking it very seriously.

We will continue improving our defense capacities as much as needed to be as ready as we should be.

I have a question about the pace. How quickly will Paris, London, Berlin, Vilnius, Warsaw — all those states that are aware of the threat and the imbalance in world politics — be ready to make important decisions? What will be the new policy of the European Union and individual states, our allies, towards Kyiv? But here, I’m particularly interested in the specific material component.

Indeed, you're completely right. I mean, the time for declarations is over. I think we have to admit that we made so many mistakes and wasted so much time still designing some kind of preventive diplomatic programs and actions. We invested in Minsk I and Minsk II, believing they would stop the aggressor. Nothing like that happened.

So, time is not on our side, as I said, but I feel a very positive momentum is now prevailing in Brussels and in many capitals, not all EU capitals, I fully agree. I’m not speaking about, for example, Budapest, or to a certain degree, Bratislava. There are some neutral countries with their own points of view on the defense policy of the European Union. But I think we have to do as much as possible to create a European Defense Union, just as we have, for example, the European Economic Union, the Energy Union, and the Banking Union, still under construction, but there nonetheless.

The Defense Union has to be established, probably within a year or two. This white paper published by the European Commission will serve as the basis for discussions. Now, for example, the European Parliament is in full-scale debate on the European defense industry paper and decisions.

I’m sure 2025 will be a rather decisive time period in this regard. We will hear many practical decisions regarding money and new instruments, such as joint procurement and joint investments.

I’m not signaling that we have already agreed on everything, but it is well understood by many, many capitals in Europe that it’s now or never. We are speaking about the safety of our people. We are speaking about the future of the European Union and Europeans, and I’m sure that Ukraine must be a part of that safe union or safe future we are talking about.

That’s why, as I mentioned in all those papers, Ukraine is our strongest ally and partner, and we pay the right attention to Ukraine's participation in all programs and decisions aimed at creating a stronger and more resilient response to anyone who might challenge our European present future.