Security guarantees for Ukraine: options beyond NATO

Content

1. Four key takeaways from Washington talks on security guarantees

2. Building the puzzle: components of Ukraine’s security guarantees

3. Ukraine’s security guarantees as part of Europe’s collective defense

The August 19 meeting in Washington undoubtedly gave a powerful new boost to discussions on so-called “security guarantees” for Ukraine.

Why “so-called”? After the failure of the Budapest Memorandum and other legal mechanisms (including bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia) concerning Ukraine’s security and beyond, “security guarantees” can only be discussed in terms of practical tools that will physically ensure the deterrence of Russia’s aggressive actions and intentions. This is a simple detail, but it immediately crystallizes the criteria for forming and implementing any security mechanisms concerning Ukraine following further decisions within the Ukraine–Europe–U.S.–Russia framework.

At this point, it is already possible to integrate the information that emerged after the Washington meeting and formulate basic approaches proposed for discussion by the U.S. administration for European allies and Ukraine.

Four key takeaways from Washington talks on security guarantees

The first fact noted: the United States will participate in providing security guarantees for Ukraine. Until recently, the Trump administration was categorically opposed even to discussing such a prospect. The “coalition of the willing” mostly consisted of European countries, and according to Trump, Europe was to bear the main burden of “reining in Vladimir.”

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy particularly emphasized the importance of the U.S. position change. “The United States was not part of the security guarantees before our meeting in Washington. We must understand this. Now we have heard about their readiness to join. This is very important for Ukraine and all of Europe,” the Ukrainian president said. According to him, without U.S. coordination of security guarantees, there had been some uncertainty among European colleagues.

After the U.S. joined, the situation changed, and European partners gained the necessary support for further practical steps.

By the way, Turkey immediately responded to the U.S. readiness to guarantee Ukraine’s security, announcing the possibility of joining security measures in the Black Sea, which is also significant progress for Ukraine. Romania stated its willingness to provide its military bases to support peace guarantees in Ukraine.

The second fact is that there are currently no clear parameters for the concept of “security guarantees.” The main narrative: European countries bear the primary burden, the United States may participate politically and provide support to Europe in critical areas (air, space, electronic intelligence, as well as assistance to European allies in other key components) but without a direct presence in Ukraine.

The third fact is that Russia is categorically opposed to the participation of only Western countries in efforts to ensure Ukraine’s security. The Kremlin insists on China’s involvement and openly trolls President Trump by suggesting “Russia’s participation in guaranteeing” Ukraine’s security. It is clear that Moscow’s main aim is to block any efforts to achieve real peace and to buy time to continue offensive actions in Donbas.

The fourth fact is that, with Trump’s support, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s idea of providing Ukraine with security guarantees based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but outside NATO, was highlighted again. If taken literally, this proposal suggests signing bilateral mutual defense agreements with Ukraine. Theoretically, this could be a fairly good alternative to NATO for Ukraine. In practice, any allied agreements will only be effective if they include specific obligations for the signatories and clear mechanisms for their implementation. The phantom pains of the Budapest Memorandum serve as a reminder that even signatures from the U.S. president and the U.K. prime minister do not make a paper document effective without proper practical enforcement.

Building the puzzle: components of Ukraine’s security guarantees

Regarding the content of the “security guarantees” format, it is currently known that they will consist of the following functional components:

• military presence of the “coalition of the willing” countries;
• air defense;
• weaponry;
• monitoring of the ceasefire.

In addition, there are currently several options for the direct implementation of the plan to provide “security guarantees” to Ukraine:

• A training mission to prepare the Defense Forces of Ukraine. This scenario involves deploying foreign instructors directly on Ukrainian territory. The United Kingdom and France could send thousands of troops to train the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the western regions, including near Lviv. A coordination center in Kyiv would be headed by a representative from one of the European countries, with a primary focus on logistics, weaponry, and strengthening the Ground Forces. This approach has two key advantages: it is cheaper and faster than sending Ukrainian troops to train in Europe, and it sends a strong political signal to the Kremlin. In practice, it would mean a European military presence on Ukrainian soil, deterring Moscow from further escalation. However, Europeans would avoid direct participation in combat operations in Ukraine. This scenario could be complemented by allied missions for airspace protection and mine-clearing operations in the Black Sea.
• Air defense provision. In this scenario, the “coalition of the willing” would focus on providing air defense through various means, including fighter jet patrols, drone deployment, airspace monitoring with radar, and other measures to prevent aggressive actions by Russia. This scenario appears less risky in terms of direct Western involvement, but it raises questions about effectiveness: are allies prepared to use weapons in the event of Russian aggression? Essentially, it represents an intermediate option between demonstrating presence and providing real security guarantees.
• Security guarantees similar to NATO Article 5. This option, proposed by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in March, envisions a special agreement between the U.S., European allies, and Ukraine, providing an “analogue” of collective defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine, such an agreement would obligate allies to treat the aggression as an attack on themselves. While this scenario currently seems more like a political message than a concrete mechanism, it could serve as a significant deterrent to Putin, especially if key European countries join.
• The Japan or South Korea model. This scenario mirrors the U.S. strategic approach to bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea. Similar to the agreements with Tokyo or Seoul, Washington could sign a mutual defense agreement with Kyiv and deploy American forces on Ukrainian territory. This model provides a more stable and long-term format for guarantees, allowing Ukraine to integrate into the Western security architecture even without formal NATO membership. However, unlike other scenarios, this option involves a permanent U.S. military presence and direct obligations to defend Ukraine, which currently remains uncertain.

Ukraine’s security guarantees as part of Europe’s collective defense

Despite the variety of scenarios and options, the final decision regarding the paradigm of Ukraine’s security guarantees from allies will depend both on specific political decisions following consultations among the “coalition of the willing” countries and on Trump’s efforts to compel Putin to meet with President Zelenskyy and end the war against Ukraine.

At the same time, there is a crucial aspect that could become an integral element of any steps to ensure Ukraine’s security and deter Russia: the comprehensive integration of Ukraine’s, Europe’s, and the U.S.’s capabilities in defense and the defense-industrial sector to achieve the main goal — deterring Russia. This involves forming a joint security system for Europe, including Ukraine, with support from the U.S. and other countries. This security system should include air and missile defense systems to protect against Russian missile and drone threats, ballistic and cruise missiles for long-range strikes on Russian territory, joint combat capabilities for rapid response to Russian threats from the air and at sea, as well as a unified European nuclear doctrine. Additionally, the integration of Ukraine’s and Europe’s defense-industrial capacities with U.S. involvement must be ensured. Only under these conditions can real security guarantees exist — not just for Ukraine, but for all of Europe. Because paper agreements no longer work — for Russia, only armed force speaks.

The material was prepared in collaboration with the Consortium for Defense Information (CDI), a project that unites Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and aims to strengthen informational support and analytical capabilities in the fields of national security, defense, and geopolitics.