Why Russia's "carpet bombing" now comes from drones and how Ukraine can counter

Ukrainian military and political observer Oleksandr Kovalenko shared his opinions on the matter.

In the early hours of June 10, Ukraine’s rear once again came under a massive drone assault involving Shahed-136 kamikaze drones and Geran/Parody decoy drones. A total of 315 drones were used, 284 of which were intercepted. The concentrated attack primarily targeted Kyiv, followed by Odesa as the second most heavily hit city. Simultaneously with the drone barrage, Russian forces launched missiles, including two North Korean-made KN-23 ballistic missiles and five Iskander-K missiles.

According to military and political observer Oleksandr Kovalenko, "the intensification of attacks on rear areas of Ukraine—especially with kamikaze and decoy drones — has been observed since the second half of May and late last month, as Russia’s spring offensive transitioned into its summer phase, which the Russian command places high hopes on."

Kovalenko notes that on May 25, Russia carried out a massive missile strike using 55 missiles of various types, accompanied by 298 drones. Following this, peak drone attack figures were recorded on May 26 – 355 drones, June 1 – 472 drones, June 6 – 407 drones, and June 9 – 479 drones. Missile strikes also resumed on June 6, involving 45 missiles of various types, and again on June 9 with 20 missiles launched. Kovalenko asserts, "It is evident that Russia will continue to accompany its offensive campaign with efforts to terrorize the civilian population and strike Ukraine’s rear. And as seen, drones have taken center stage in this strategy."

Russia’s production capacity for Shahed-136

Since 2022, after initially testing Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, Russia has sought to not only improve their characteristics but also localize and scale up their serial production. According to recent intelligence from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, Kovalenko highlights that "Russia now produces about 2,700 Shahed-136 drones per month — or roughly 90 drones per day." Production is tracked through serial numbering: drones marked with the letters "Ы" or "Ь" are made at the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan; those with "K", "KM", or "КЦ" are produced at the Izhevsk plant. From 2022 to 2023, most observed drones had serials starting with "M", indicating Iranian origin.

Kovalenko further explains that "parallel production of decoy drones like Geran/Parody — designed to mimic Shahed-136 and divert air defense systems — is also ongoing, with about 2,500 units produced monthly." This brings Russia’s total drone output for such operations to over 5,000 units per month. He observes that "so far, there hasn't been a single month where drone attacks on Ukraine surpassed 5,000, but Russia appears to be striving for that benchmark." In the first 10 days of June alone, Russia deployed 2,315 Shahed-136, Geran, or Parody drones against Ukraine.

What Is Russia trying to achieve?

Shahed-136 is a low-cost weapon, and its main disadvantage is its low breakthrough rate — no more than 3% when faced with layered air defenses. It also performs poorly against hardened targets and is ineffective against bunker-type facilities. However, Kovalenko states, "for instilling fear in the civilian population and spreading panic, it is quite effective." Since 2025, Russia has significantly shifted its use of Shahed-136 toward a more concentrated, carpet-bombing-like tactic. This was first tested in Odesa, where around 30 Shahed-136 drones attacked simultaneously from an altitude of 3 kilometers. The current variants of Shahed-136 used in Ukraine are equipped with 90 kg warheads, comparable in explosive power to the OFAB-250 aerial bomb.

Kovalenko recalls that "in the early days of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia used traditional carpet bombing, but this tactic quickly became too costly due to guaranteed aircraft losses over urban targets." Now, he argues, "sending 20, 40, or 60 Shahed-136 drones serves the same purpose as deploying up to three Su-34 bombers." These drone strikes are indiscriminate and often target densely populated areas, highlighting their aim to terrorize and pressure Ukraine into surrender. In addition to kamikaze drones, Russia has recently ramped up its use of missiles.

Missile strikes

Kovalenko notes that "it’s clear that the current scale of missile strikes does not match the intensity seen in 2022, 2023, or even 2024. However, they have notably increased since the beginning of 2025." In just the first 10 days of June, Russia launched 103 missiles of various types — surpassing the March total of 85.

Despite this increase, Kovalenko observes that "the missile strikes have had little to no impact on the battlefield." Some do target military-industrial facilities, but as he points out, "since the start of the full-scale war, much of Ukraine’s defense production has been relocated to safer, protected areas. Civilian operations are often all that remain, meaning these attacks mainly impact non-military production." Strikes on airfields, often part of a frenzied pursuit of F-16s, also raise questions of effectiveness for Kovalenko: "For example, the launch of a Russian Tu-95 bomber is detected almost immediately, and with about 1.5 hours required to reach launch range and another hour for missile flight, Ukrainian aircraft are already airborne by then."

Kovalenko concludes that "missile attacks on energy and other civilian infrastructure continue and carry more weight for Russia than targeting a single F-16." Disrupting power systems and industrial facilities deals economic blows and hampers normal life in Ukraine’s rear areas. Ultimately, he stresses, "these attacks do not serve a purely military purpose but aim to terrorize, pressure Ukraine into surrender, and destabilize its economy and society."

Response or systematic counteraction

In 2022, Ukraine lacked the capacity to strike deep into Russian territory — neither with missiles nor drones. Kovalenko emphasizes that "at the time, it had no developed long-range strike capabilities, underscoring that Ukraine posed no real threat to Russia." However, he adds, "constant violations of war laws by Russia and its focus on civilian targets forced Ukraine to develop such means."

Ukraine’s primary strike tools now include long-range drones of its own design, such as "Liutyi" and "Bober." These are used against military infrastructure, warehouses, airfields, oil refineries, and military-industrial plants. Kovalenko cites one of the most notable recent operations, Spider's Web, which "resulted in the destruction or damage of dozens of strategic aircraft regularly used in missile attacks on Ukraine." He highlights that "these are high-precision strikes guided by artificial intelligence, vastly different from what Russia employs."

Kovalenko counters potential criticism by stating that "Russian sources are unable to provide evidence of destroyed civilian neighborhoods after Ukrainian drone strikes." Instead, he notes that recent strikes have hit targets like the All-Russian Research Institute of Radio Engineering in Cheboksary — responsible for making Kometa-M antennas used in glide bombs and Shahed-136 drones — as well as the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd and a fuel depot in Engels.

Today, Kovalenko observes that "Ukraine operates a broad range of strike drones, deploying them in large numbers depending on the mission." Simultaneously, it is advancing its ballistic missile development program. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently announced successful tests of a new ballistic missile. Kovalenko suggests that "in addition to the cruise missile R-360 from the Neptune coastal defense system, Ukraine may soon be capable of conducting combined strikes on Russian territory."

Kovalenko believes it’s important to note that "Ukraine’s actions should not be seen merely as retaliation. These are systematic efforts aimed at weakening the enemy at its most vulnerable points." He poses a rhetorical question: "Can Russia replace Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, or Tu-160 bombers? No. Destroying them results in irreversible losses to Russia’s nuclear triad."

He further argues that "Russia’s heavy reliance on energy extraction and processing makes it extremely vulnerable." Refineries and gas distribution stations are regularly taken offline. Kovalenko provides data: "In 2024, attacks on refineries cut Russian oil exports by 20%. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, that figure is already at 15%." Moreover, he states, "Russia’s defense industry is often concentrated in single locations, meaning a successful strike can paralyze entire components of its military capability."

In essence, Kovalenko concludes, "Russia is trying to frighten, demoralize, and force Kyiv into surrender. Meanwhile, Ukraine is waging a war of attrition — not just on the battlefield, but deep within Russia itself. And this war will only escalate further from both sides in the near future."