Washington meeting results: Putin must face more pressure

1. Two issues were on the agenda: territorial swaps and security guarantees.

2. The topic of territorial swaps was effectively not discussed. Zelenskyy proposed to postpone it until a personal meeting with Putin. Apparently, this arrangement suited Trump.

The likelihood of a personal meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy is extremely low. Putin openly despises Zelenskyy, and at most he might agree to a meeting for the purpose of accepting capitulation. Even then, he would likely delegate someone like the "historian" Medinsky or even the so-called “DPR leader” Pushilin.

Thus, the proposal to move the territories discussion to a trilateral meeting essentially means a hope of avoiding the topic altogether.

3. It is worth noting that a ceasefire along the current front line could happen without a personal meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy. To this end, Putin is offered three options:

– agree to a meeting with the “illegitimate Zelenskyy”;
– agree to end the war along the front line without additional meetings;
– withdraw from negotiations and continue fighting.

The third option can be dismissed, since Putin needs negotiations. But his choice between a meeting with Zelenskyy or ending the war without one will be of interest not only to Ukrainians.

4. The assumption that Zelenskyy might make a decision on any territorial exchanges is false.

The July protests in Ukraine against the attempt to abolish NABU’s independence showed that no matter what decisions are made in the President’s Office, without society’s consent they will not work. In other words, if Americans believe they can reach some agreement with Zelenskyy and then simply “push it down,” that is a rather naive position.

5. Regarding security guarantees, this issue is much more important and more complicated than territories.

It is obvious that after fighting stops — whether through a large peace treaty or an armistice — Ukraine will remain a problem for Russia.

The scenario in which, the day after signing an agreement, Moscow says: “Great, now let’s deal with the Arctic,” looks naive. Ukraine will remain nearby, a large country with tens of millions of people who hate Russia, remember the dead, and are likely dissatisfied with the terms of the agreement and eager to revise it as unfair.

Thus, the Ukrainian question will still remain on Moscow’s agenda. But while before 2022 it was not critical, after years of brutal war Ukraine will objectively create real threats to Putin’s Russia. In such a configuration, a new Russian invasion is almost inevitable.

This is precisely why security guarantees are the most complex issue: Russia will seek to preserve the ability to resume war at any moment, while Ukraine wants guarantees that war will never return. It is obvious that no Russian laws — from the Criminal Code article on war of aggression to the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,” which included respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity — provide any real guarantees.

Thus, security guarantees for Ukraine must be ensured not by Russian laws, not by the Budapest Memorandum, and not by verbal assurances such as “if I am president, there will be no war” or “we will support you as long as needed.” They must be real mechanisms that truly guarantee Ukraine’s security.

6. After the Washington summit, the answer to the question “when will the war end?” remains unchanged: the war will end when Putin decides to stop waging it.

Therefore, there is no point in pressuring Zelenskyy to sign or agree to something.

Pressure must be applied to Putin — either verbally, as has been the case for the past six months, or through decisive actions: supplying weapons, imposing sanctions, and providing other forms of military assistance to Ukraine. There are no other options.

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About the author: Mykola Knyazhytskyi, journalist, Member of the Ukrainian Parliament

The editorial team does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by authors of blogs or columns.