Ukraine needs cheaper, smarter ways to down Russian drones as Shahed threat evolves

Ukrainian military and political observer Oleksandr Kovalenko has highlighted a notable shift in Russia’s use of Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, saying it demands a reassessment of Ukraine’s air defense approach

Since February–March 2025, Russian forces have been launching Shahed drones at higher altitudes — around 1,500 meters over land and up to 2,500 meters from the sea — making mobile fire teams and even some missile systems less effective.

"Targets are now detected earlier by radar, but the dilemma is whether to waste expensive missiles on them or take the risk," Kovalenko explains.

Russia has also altered the Shaheds' final strike trajectory. Instead of a steep dive from 2.5 km, they now descend to about 1 km and stabilize before impact — improving accuracy and shortening the window for mobile teams or MANPADS to intercept. “Even with MANPADS, interception during this short stabilization phase is unlikely,” Kovalenko notes.

As Ukraine looks for answers, Kovalenko emphasizes that relying solely on missiles is unsustainable. “Using an expensive missile to destroy a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone is justified only when there is no alternative, and when the consequences of the drone hitting its target could be catastrophic.” Systems like the Skyguard/Aspide or MIM-23 HAWK are highly effective, but costly and limited in supply.

Kovalenko also points out that several effective short-range air defense systems exist around the world — but are either not transferred to Ukraine or remain underutilized. Among these are the German LeFlaSys/ASRAD and the Soviet-era S-125, OSA, and Strela-10. Some, like the Roland SAM, were decommissioned but could still be valuable. “The latest modification of the Roland SAM had a SAM speed of 620 m/s, a flight range of up to 8.5 km, and a maximum effective target destruction altitude of 6,000 m. Ideal against all possible tactics for using the Shahed-136 today.” Yet Germany insists they are gone, despite previously possessing over 180 of these systems.

Another overlooked option is the American MIM-72A/M48 Chaparral. “According to the characteristics, the MIM-72A/M48 Chaparral could hit targets at a distance of up to 8 km and at an altitude of up to 3 km. The missile speed is 1.5 Mach, which gives it the ability to intercept a wide range of subsonic targets, from kamikaze drones to cruise missiles.” Although officially retired from U.S. service, many remain in use globally — in Taiwan, Morocco, and Egypt, for example.

Despite their availability, Kovalenko notes that “a number of short-range air defense systems are simply not being supplied to Ukraine. This raises the question: is the issue that these systems truly no longer exist after decommissioning, or…”

In addition to missile-based systems, anti-aircraft artillery remains an important pillar of defense. Ukraine already uses platforms like the ZSU Gepard, ZU-23-2, and Shilka, but other systems like Greece’s Artemis-30 or the Oerlikon 35-mm L/90 GDF-007 — in use across Europe — could significantly enhance capabilities. "Given the current threats, the most useful anti-aircraft systems for Ukraine are those capable of intercepting targets at altitudes of at least 2 kilometers."

When it comes to alternatives, Kovalenko proposes unconventional yet practical ideas — particularly for intercepting drones in cost-effective ways. He highlights his long-standing advocacy for the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, a light turboprop aircraft. “In matters of countering the Shahed-136, the Super Tucano would be an ideal solution,” he argues, citing its affordability, endurance, and flexibility.

He also revisits a missed opportunity from 2018: the U.S. auction of surplus AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters. “At that time, I considered them as a very promising opportunity to update the fleet of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” he recalls. Yet, the idea faced strong opposition from domestic proponents of the AH-64 Apache.

A few years later, Washington canceled a transfer of 12 AH-1Z Viper helicopters originally intended for Pakistan — a decision Kovalenko believes Ukraine should have capitalized on. Today, the Viper could be a game-changer. “The Viper would be an ideal means of intercepting the Shahed-136, especially given its modernization to a maximum speed of 411 km/h, a maximum flight altitude of 6,000 m, and a wide range of weapons used.”

In the end, Kovalenko’s warning is clear: Ukraine needs a diverse and economically sustainable approach to dealing with Shahed drones. Whether through modernized legacy systems, overlooked Western inventories, or cost-efficient alternatives like light attack aircraft, the key is adaptability.