Striking Russia: Analyst explains limits for Ukraine on U.S. arms and nuclear red lines

Oleksiy Yizhak, an analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information, shared his opinions with Espreso TV.

The expert points out that in spring 2025, Donald Trump’s administration introduced a “review mechanism” requiring Pentagon approval for every launch of ATACMS, British Storm Shadow, or other long-range weapons using U.S. technology.

That policy appears to be shifting. This summer, Washington has signaled a broader level of permissions for Ukraine, reflected in the massive deliveries of ERAM.

At the same time, the expert notes that while the framework of the “nuclear code” still exists, the boundaries of what might be seen as a violation are increasingly uncertain.

“It is noteworthy that after Ukraine’s Spider Web Operation, Russia did not raise its usual ‘nuclear alarm.’ The reason is clear: the ‘nuclear code’ was not violated. First, the strike targeted military platforms with non-nuclear equipment, which Russia itself had excluded from the nuclear planning regime in order to wage a non-nuclear war against Ukraine. Second, the Spider Web Operation was carried out independently by Ukraine and not in coordination with any other nuclear power. As a result, Russia effectively accepted the strike as legitimate,” the expert explained.

According to him, it is evident that the U.S., the UK, and France would not assume any role in operations like Spider Web on Russian territory, since such involvement could be interpreted as an allied nuclear power attacking Russia. “This will remain the case until Ukraine establishes allied relations with the U.S., the UK, and France. At the same time, the Spider Web Operation has shown that the framework of the ‘nuclear code’ is broad enough to allow conventional strikes against military targets on Russian territory,” the expert concluded.

As is well known, U.S. allies that come under attack may use American weapons under their right to individual and collective self-defense. Restrictions imposed by Washington — such as those currently applied to Ukraine as a non-ally — do not apply in these cases.

“The situation could change if U.S. NATO allies extend their own security guarantees to Ukraine, which itself has no alliance with the United States. In that case, the risk of ‘dragging’ the U.S. into a war with Russia on Ukraine’s behalf becomes relevant. This makes the question of using American weapons against targets in Russia central to effective European guarantees for Ukraine: potential guarantors need such permissions,” the expert noted.

Oleksiy Yizhak outlines two possible scenarios for such permissions. The first is that European countries, in implementing guarantees for Ukraine outside NATO, would remain subject to the same restrictions on the use of U.S. weapons and technology as Ukraine. The second is that they would enjoy the same rights as NATO members, meaning full authority to use American weapons for self-defense.

He concludes that, in the event of a threat of escalation, Ukraine’s defense forces and guarantor countries could receive the following permissions:

– Unrestricted use of American weapons against Russian targets on Ukraine’s government-controlled territory;

– Group permission to strike Russian military facilities and infrastructure in temporarily occupied territories, limited to a defined geographical area;

– Targeted permission to strike military sites on Russian territory directly involved in sustaining aggression, as part of a specific operation in response;

– Special permission for individual strikes on strategically important targets inside Russia.