Сonflict between Russian Defense Ministry and Prigozhin has reached its peak

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) shared the information in its report.

ISW analysts believe that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov are likely to use the opportunity to deliberately use both elite and convicted Wagner forces in Bakhmut to weaken Prigozhin and undermine his ambitions for greater influence in the Kremlin.

The Russian Defense Ministry has increasingly limited Prigozhin's ability to recruit convicts and store ammunition, forcing him to publicly acknowledge his dependence on the ministry. For example, he has already publicly complained that he sent a letter and tried to send his representative - probably to Shoigu and Gerasimov - with an urgent request for ammunition, but his representative was not allowed to file a complaint.

The Institute noted that the Wagner PMC founder was able to increase his forces by 40,000 convicts, probably with the Kremlin's permission to recruit in prisons in 2022, but lost this permission and access to this personnel reserve in early 2023. Against this backdrop, he threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut and hinted that the Russian Defense Ministry "used Wagner to bear the brunt of the high-intensity attritional urban warfare" and "seize Bakhmut" while retaining conventional Russian forces. According to experts, these threats and complaints indicate that Prigozhin is aware of the seriousness of his conflict with the Defense Ministry.

"The Russian military leadership may be trying to expend Wagner forces – and Prigozhin’s influence – in Bakhmut," ISW suggests.

Experts noted that the rate of the Russian troops' advance in Bakhmut slowed down "following the Ukrainian withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut around March 7." They estimated that Wagner PMC had to use its elite units to maintain the offensive momentum, but that these forces may be running out of steam during direct attacks on the eastern, southern, and northern parts of Bakhmut.

The report says that Prigozhin anticipated that Ukrainian troops would withdraw completely from Bakhmut "out of fear of imminent encirclement" and hoped that his involvement in Wagner's elite force would be sufficient to create such an effect. On March 3, he even suggested to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be allowed to withdraw from Bakhmut "in 2 days."

"Limited information about the Prigozhin’s pleas likely indicates that the Russian military command is intent on expending Wagner forces within the city. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Serhiy Cherevatyi also noted on March 11 that Ukrainian forces may be able to severely degrade Wagner and have already thinned out Wagner’s second prisoner formation over the winter. Ukrainian servicemen noted in a social media video from March 12 that they are holding positions in Bakhmut waiting for Russians to “shoot each other.” Russian military leadership may be allowing the Wagner Group to take high casualties in Bakhmut to simultaneously erode Prigozhin’s leverage while capturing the city at the expense of Wagner troops," ISW explained.

"The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to avenge itself on Prigozhin for a conflict that he initiated in May 2022," the analysts believe. 

According to their estimates, the Kremlin probably gave the PMC founder its support when Russian dictator Vladimir Putin tried to replenish his forces with volunteers to avoid announcing an extremely unpopular mobilization. Prigozhin may have convinced Putin that he could capture Bakhmut if he gained access to the Russian Defense Ministry's ammunition stockpile and allowed him to expand his existing ultranationalism recruitment campaigns to include ordinary Russians and prisoners.

Putin probably gave Prigozhin access to these resources because he was becoming increasingly frustrated with the Russian military command, which failed to capture Kyiv "in 3 days" and actually squandered its reserves without achieving any tangible results in the war.

"Putin likely perceived the Russian military command’s appeals for mobilization as a threat to the stability of his regime and placed his confidence in Prigozhin whose forces had already helped seize Popasna, Sievierodonetsk, and Lysychansk in the Luhansk region. Putin’s decision to side with Prigozhin likely angered Shoigu and Gerasimov, who were then tasked with sharing limited equipment and ammunition with Wagner mercenaries," ISW explained.

The institute's report also says that Prigozhin is unlikely to regain Putin's favor, which he had between May and October 2022.

"Prigozhin’s fall from grace will likely scare other Kremlin officials such as Kadyrov into scaling down their ambitions to avoid experiencing Prigozhin’s fate," the experts add.

In addition, in their opinion, "Prigozhin had earned a bad reputation for the treatment of his forces as cannon fodder and had drained ultranationalist communities of recruits.” And Prigozhin’s public pleas for ammunition and supplies are also unlikely to make service with Wagner attractive to recruits.

"The conflict between the Russian MoD and Wagner shows that different parties in Putin’s inner circle are competing with one another in potentially zero-sum games that do not further Putin’s overall objectives," analysts say.

• Relations between Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russia's top military leadership have long been strained. He has repeatedly complained about the lack of adequate supplies of ammunition to his militants, publicly criticized and scandalized officials of the Russian Defense Ministry, including its head, Sergei Shoigu. Recently, the founder of Wagner PMC stated that he and other high-ranking Wagner fighters were completely disconnected from the Russian government communication line and had all passes to Russian ministries blocked.