This is a difficult topic because it always leads us into the field of paranoia, conspiracy theories, and the search for "complex multi-steps." But this ‘overcomplicating’ is almost always a search for a simple answer about people's motivations. Why would they want "Russia's non-defeat," negotiations, and concessions? The simple answer is because of money. But it is not always the case.
To begin with. Let's define what cases and techniques we are talking about. From direct statements about negotiations and "Ukraine must give up Crimea for peace" to various publications "both sides are suffering unacceptable losses", "Ukraine must mobilize 3 million people to win", manipulative articles in the NYT and other media.
"This sentiment is not mainstream. Most Western elites, ordinary citizens, and the media support Ukraine. The level of support in most leading countries is gradually increasing. But such techniques still influence decision-making. Of course, the main beneficiary of this "move" is Russia. It is the one that launches campaigns to promote theses that are convenient for them."
But why are they supported or developed? There may be several reasons or a combination of reasons in the minds of the authors. I would focus on the following:
Pacifist humanism. Thesis statement: "Any war is evil and must be stopped at any cost. Ukraine's territorial concessions are not important compared to the lives saved." Life is better than non-life. In such a paradigm, there is no need to analyze the root causes of the conflict and the intentions of the parties.
Fear. Supporters of this concept believe that nuclear escalation is possible. This is where both Cold War paranoia and Russian propaganda come to life, reminding us from time to time that Russia has nuclear weapons.
Selfishness. According to the authors, their countries: a) should not be directly involved in the war; b) should minimize their own losses from the consequences. At the same time, Ukraine's loss of some territory or subjectivity is seen as an acceptable sacrifice. This includes talk about inflation, migration, the environment, and other issues. Often, they are not related to the war at all.
Using Russia as a tool to fight China and curb its ambitions. This concept is still alive in many minds in the West. Because if you look beyond the last 15–20 years, the previous iteration of the empire (the USSR) had very difficult relations with China for almost the entire second half of the 20th century. So there is a temptation to bring back 1969.
Russian resources are important. Thus, the current sanctions are designed to limit Russia's revenues from the export of oil, gas, grain, and fertilizers as much as possible, but are not aimed at blocking them in principle. Russia is forced to transport oil and gas longer and more expensively, and sell it cheaper. All this is being done now with the sole purpose of avoiding supply shocks, i.e. a sharp rise in the price of resources. This is the logic behind the approach of "minimizing" the losses of the leading economies from the war.
Russians, Russia, its political and cultural influence will not go away, and Putin will not last forever. Therefore, according to the authors' logic, it is very useful to avoid the formation of revanchist sentiments and turning Russians into an analog of the Germans of the 20s and 30s. Thus, the fact that a significant proportion of Russians are already absorbed in revanchism for the defeat in the Cold War is ignored.
The risks of Russia's complete defeat are too great. This is precisely the consequence of the previous points and is added to them. This combines fears of an even more fascist government in Russia with a willingness to actually fight NATO (or radicalization of the current regime), fear that Russian nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of several unpredictable actors, or that - for example - China will take full control of Siberia and its resources.
"It is true that Russia's defeat creates a vast field of unknowns. And Russia itself and its sympathizers are playing on the fears of people who have them quite sincerely."
But Putin has done a lot to make all these arguments gradually fade into the background. Because the fact that he is a cheater, a swindler, and ready for a continental war for the sake of vested interests makes his defeat all too necessary. And that's what we're sticking to.
About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist and strategic communications specialist in business, public administration and politics.
The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.