Why Ukraine war isn't likely to end anytime soon

The Telegraph published an article claiming that, during the war, a middle class has emerged in Russia that does not want the war to end. And this is supposedly the main reason the fighting continues. Many Ukrainian media outlets have widely circulated this, well, almost nonsense.

In the book Post-Putin: Russia We Will Have to Live With for the Next 50 Years, I, together with Vitaliy Pyrovych, tried to calculate the beneficiaries of this war. And there are not as many as it might seem at first glance — about 10% of Russia’s total population. But, first, this is not exactly the middle class, and second, we can only guess what portion of them wants the war to continue at any cost (I assume far from 100%, at most 70–75%).

The reasons why Putin does not want to end the war lie elsewhere. What are these reasons?

1. He has not achieved any of the goals of 2022 (Russia has not become and will not become a third pole of the world; Russia has not gained, and seems to have lost, the ability to exercise unlimited policing functions in the post-Soviet space; thanks to the war, it will no longer be possible to stop the de-Slavization of Russia).

2. Putin relies on 25% of ultra-patriots who want the war to continue until Ukraine is destroyed (these figures come from our research and the New-Image Group study). Putin does not know how to end the war without turning this proactive minority into his opponents.

3. In Russia, there is a large-scale nationalization (redistribution of property) primarily in the interests of six families (Patrushev, Chemezov, Kirienko, Rotenberg, Kovalchuk, Sechin), although many high-ranking security officials benefit from the “fragments.” Ending the war could change the rules of this phase of wealth accumulation and thus the preparation for a power transition. Putin’s inner circle will resist ending the war for some time.

4. We have entered a new stage of negotiations where the main negotiators are China and the U.S. (within these talks, there is a likelihood that negotiations about Ukraine will take place). Putin wants to play the mediator in these negotiations (spoiler: he will not succeed, as he is not needed as a mediator). But he will try to bargain for two things: nuclear weapons reductions (which Trump could sell as a victory and which, theoretically, could appeal to Xi) and participation in the development of the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic shelf by both China and the U.S. simultaneously.

The economic logic plus nuclear weapons is what appeals to Trump, but his goal is successful negotiations with China, which are only just beginning. China’s logic is to officially gain the status of a second global pole within these talks and agree on trade coexistence for the next 10–15 years, which entails the collapse of the World Trade Organization system (this is what Trump will insist on). And, of course, China and the U.S. will negotiate rules of the game that prevent direct military confrontation between them.

Our fundamental problem (at all levels, including among experts) is the unwillingness to recognize the changes already happening before our eyes. Therefore, we need to adjust our negotiation strategy. The new negotiation logic is not just the emergence of another key negotiator. It is also a new race, at least 5,000 meters long.

Source

About the author. Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.