War without state: why patriots, not institutions, are winning fight
At the dawn of the fourth year of the Great War between Moscow and Ukraine, one thing becomes painfully clear: Ukraine’s loudest and most successful victories are not always the result of coordinated strategic leadership by the state, but often the expression of the will, intelligence, and initiative of individual patriots
They fight not because of the system, but alongside it — sometimes independently, sometimes in parallel. They build drones, plan strikes, and win new kinds of wars — without bureaucracy, without excessive procedures, without grandstanding rhetoric. Each such operation is not just a blow to Russia. It’s a signal of potential that has yet to become systemic.
A covert victory: when initiative outpaces structure
Operation "Depth" — a strike on the supports of the Crimean Bridge. Operation "Spider Web" — the destruction of dozens of Russian strategic aviation aircraft. Both will go down in history books. But not so much as examples of centralized state management, rather as proof of high initiative, engineering genius, and the ability to act autonomously. These were not flashy acts. They were precise, well-planned, and highly professional strikes. And that’s why they were so effective.
They show that Ukraine has services, people, and groups capable of acting in difficult conditions using unconventional thinking and asymmetric approaches. Their logic isn’t bureaucratic — it’s strategic. Not limited by form, but full of substance. And in this lies the strength of the new Ukrainian military mindset.
Negotiations don’t stop the war
While unique results are being achieved on the battlefield, the Ukrainian state sometimes acts as if preparing not for victory but for another round of negotiations. The rhetoric of “peace plans,” diplomatic breakthroughs, and balancing partners’ expectations with frontline realities cannot stop the war. The enemy does not cease attacks, does not change its goals, and does not limit its resources. So the illusion that a political compromise will save the country is false.
No diplomatic gesture can compensate for the lack of deep internal transformation. What we need is not a strategy to “survive the winter,” but a plan for total systemic victory. This plan must include not only the armed forces but also the economy, industry, science, and education. Ukraine must prepare not for peace — but for a prolonged, multi-year effort to destroy Moscow’s infrastructure and capacity to wage aggressive war.
This means destroying the sources of their missiles, paralyzing their military-industrial complex, and cutting them off from the Eurasian technological chain. Diplomats won’t do this. Engineers, strategists, scientists, manufacturers, modernized military, and civilian institutions must.
Uneven efforts: effectiveness and vulnerability
While individual operations impress the world with precision and ingenuity, the systemic level of organization remains uneven. There are positive examples of coordination and support, and institutions that demonstrate adaptability. Yet chronic problems persist: a complicated mobilization system, slow procurement, and poor adaptation of procedures to wartime conditions.
Conclusions
Today’s reality allows no illusions. While Ukrainian special operations destroy enemy aviation and blow up imperial symbols, on the same day — June 3, 2025 — Russia launches another strike on Sumy and Mykolaiv. Civilians died under the rubble, dozens were wounded. This is not an exception. It’s Moscow’s ongoing message of “coercion to peace.”
While some prepare new “negotiation initiatives,” Ukrainian cities endure terror. The enemy does not respond to diplomacy — only to force. Any hope that political agreements will restrain the aggressor is a strategic mistake. Only systemic destruction of Russia’s military potential, full mobilization of the economy, science, production, and education focused on victory can guarantee security. Otherwise, it’s just a pause before the next war.
Leadership that thinks in election cycles or support cycles, rather than cycles of destroying the enemy — cannot win this war. Its main task is not to manage processes, but to create a system that produces victories. If it fails, it will be replaced by those who today operate in the shadows but deliver results.
Ukraine has a chance to end the Moscow threat once and for all. But for that, it must not make peace — it must strike.
About the author. Vladyslav Smyrnov, Ukrainian entrepreneur, public figure, specialist in healthcare planning and development
The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.
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