Ukraine's role in shaping European defense discussed. Three takeaways from security roundtable

The roundtable discussion "Ukraine's role and place in shaping European security and defense systems," organized by the Defense Information Consortium, took place in Kyiv. Here are a few expert opinions summarized by Espreso.

Valeriy Chaly: Europe's strategy is clear, the question is tactics: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or peace enforcement?

Valeriy Chaly, head of the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Ukraine.

Europe is pretending, Europe sees what needs to be done. Therefore, the strategy is generally known, and it is clear. However, the issue lies in understanding the tactical actions. For instance, the discussion about peacekeeping forces as a component of peace establishment. In our case, when one country is aggressing against another, the UN Charter stipulates the use of not peacekeeping, peacebuilding, but peace enforcement. The seventh chapter of the UN Charter specifies that this will be adopted by the Security Council, and then all countries must act based on the established UN rules. However, since the UN is inactive in this regard, and the Security Council’s effectiveness has been blocked by Russia, there should be a coalition created for peace enforcement. And how will this go? For the second year, we hear political discussions, and while some details are emerging, European peace enforcement contingents are still non-existent. It is crucial to understand how European plans on defense financing, coordination, and interaction will align with the EU's institutional capacity. We know that the EU is a complicated bureaucratic system, and there is also competition among different countries regarding weapons orders, and the timing of decisions on financing. Therefore, while we are more optimistic about our European partners today, problems remain.

Mikhail Samus: Who and how will build Europe's defensive forces?

Mikhail Samus, director of the New Geopolitics Research Network, co-founder of the Defense Information Consortium.

If we analyze the Joint White Paper for European Defense Readiness 2030, issued by the European Commission as an understanding of the EU's defense policy, we see that it is a visionary document outlining the main directions for defense sector development. It envisions the need for Europe to build its European defense forces or defense capabilities. This is not about the defense industry, but European defense forces, meaning Joint Defense Capabilities, which should include strategic deterrence against Russia.

But what is missing in the White Paper?

The question remains: who will implement all of this? Budget deficits are removed in all EU countries, allowing for up to 800 billion euros over four years. This provides the opportunity to develop areas like anti-aircraft defense, missile and artillery systems, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and cyber-electronic tools. But even with 800 billion euros, who will manage it? One EU commissioner’s capabilities will not be enough. If each country begins to implement these common goals, it will lead to the same issues seen with other projects in the EU over the last 30 years. There is still no military-political and military command in Europe that would handle the strategic vision’s implementation, and this remains the main problem. Unfortunately, this issue hasn’t even been addressed in Europe yet.

However, it is hopeful that there is now a clearer understanding of the goal and the ways to achieve it through the "Coalition of the Willing." French President Emmanuel Macron clearly explained what is happening and what the "Coalition of the Willing" represents.

First: A strong Ukrainian army. This is a specific task. Moreover, we understand who will implement this: Ukraine. Ukraine clearly understands its defense needs, and Europe can be informed about this very simply.

Second: President Macron adds that a joint Franco-British mission will go to Kyiv to assess the needs and determine what can be done to support Ukraine’s army in the future. Here, I think everything is clear: deterrence forces that will not be deployed on the frontline. Essentially, he describes what these deterrence forces will do, and the term has appeared for the first time: these are not peacekeeping forces, nor enforcement forces, but specifically deterrence forces, and obviously, the deterrence concerns Russia. How Russia’s aggression will be deterred is not yet clear, but it is evident that if a strong Ukrainian army is stationed on the frontline, these units will not only conduct training but also perform specific military tasks. It is also clear that a collective body for the coalition of the willing will be created regarding the situation on the front line, if this ceasefire regime is established.

Third: This is a broader push to rearm Europe and present the European perspective, including its demands in any peace negotiations. There is a political aspect here: Macron states that Europe must be present in the negotiations on a ceasefire because Europe will be responsible for the ceasefire regime and its enforcement. It would look strange if the Americans and Russians agree on something, and Europe is simply faced with the fact, just like Ukraine. This is a claim that the Coalition of Willing can institutionalize and declare itself as a force that can participate in such negotiations.

How can this be done? Europe has at least two military forces that are already ready. These are the Joint Expenditure Forces, in which the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, as well as the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands participate. This is a military format primarily focused on the ground component. There is also an interesting military-political grouping that we don’t often talk about: the Combined Joint Expenditure Forces, created in 2010 by France and the United Kingdom. They have a land, sea, air, and logistical component, including intelligence and other aspects.

In my opinion, the real possibility is to form the Coalition of the Willing based on the Combined Joint Expenditure Forces and Joint Expenditure Forces with the addition of other countries. Some of these countries will provide troops, others – finances, others will provide aviation, reconnaissance, satellite support, etc. Thus, the Ukrainian Defense Forces will be the core of the European army, and the Franco-British coalition, along with the Coalition of the Willing, can support this foundation and then form a joint European army, which, by 2030, may indeed be created.

Oleksii Yizhak: "Porcupine strategy" needs revision and modification by Ukraine

Oleksii Yizhak, expert at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, co-founder of the Defense Information Consortium.

Europeans are now fully aware of the war scenario at hand. The "Porcupine strategy" primarily involves small weapons, anti-tank missiles, and anti-aircraft missile systems against a much stronger army, essentially the tactic of many small cuts or stings. But it plays against the big, metaphorical elephant, such as large armored columns, as seen in 2022.

However, the war in Ukraine today is different. The analogy with Taiwan doesn’t entirely work here. There is a significant asymmetry in Taiwan: 130,000 Taiwanese troops against millions in China's People's Liberation Army. But in our case, it’s 800,000 against 1.5 million, which isn’t the same as allowing the enemy to strike to then tear them apart from within. In the modern balance of offensive and defensive means, the Russians can produce cheaper missiles and more of them than we can afford, with expensive air and anti-missile defense systems. If we don't have the means to strike at Engels, for example, to destroy Russian production capacity for a month or two, it won’t work.

Of course, this strategy outlined in Europe for us doesn’t contradict our own strategy of deterrence. But clearly, it needs modification and adaptation on our part. It is essential to understand that there is no historical model we can just take and say it’s ours. We need to modernize it and supplement it with our own tools: tools we’re offered, which we can create, and which exist on the security market.

For example, multinational expeditionary forces were created for Northern Europe at the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, following Crimea's occupation, as initiatives for securing NATO’s eastern flank. The United States initiated broader mechanisms, and the British initiated a system to respond to low-level threats, even hybrid threats, and the beginning of a situation like the Crimea occupation. This was a more stringent version of what the United States created in Eastern Europe. To transition from peace to large-scale war, steps of escalation are needed. These steps were created in Eastern Europe through expeditionary forces, ground brigades, and air patrol units.

But ultimately, all of this relies on the large nuclear wall in Europe, which was previously supported by the United States. On the other side, there’s a similar Russian nuclear wall. So, what’s missing now is what the British call the backstop: a large nuclear wall, into which everything will crash if a major escalation occurs. Today, Russia has a window of opportunity: the United States is withdrawing from Europe, and new tools are not created. It is unclear how everything will function during these escalation steps, when national forces are involved, followed by expeditionary forces, then U.S. brigades, and then nuclear deterrence forces, if the United States is not present. And also, when Ukrainian forces are no longer present or are disarmed at Russia's demand. Therefore, Europeans truly face a significant problem in how to gather everything together and what the final support should be if there is no American nuclear wall. Hence, we see how the British and other countries are trying to preserve the American presence. Indeed, it’s possible to prevent major escalation, but there’s a risk that Russia may soon test how these escalation steps work, not only in Ukraine but in other countries as well. Clearly, there’s a great danger given the unknown role of the United States. However, as far as non-nuclear issues go, Europe has all the tools for a large-scale war and can bring them together.

Note:
The roundtable was organized by the Defense Information Consortium, which brings together analysts from Ukrainian and international research centers: the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Defense Express Information and Consulting Company, the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies, the New Geopolitics Research Network, and others. The Consortium prepares analytical materials for state authorities, helping to make strategically important decisions for the country’s defense.