Ukraine hits Russian missile base, shells from Europe for Ukraine and DPRK for Russia – who has more? Zgurets’ column

Payback for Sumy

The Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to strike at the locations of the Russian missile brigades responsible for the criminal attack on Sumy with ballistic weapons. 

Yesterday, a video was released showing Ukrainian drones attacking the deployment base of Russia's 112th missile brigade responsible for the Iskander strike on Sumy. The location of this base is Shuya, in the Ivanovo region of Russia. It is 700 kilometers from the border with Ukraine.

The attacks began around 3 a.m. Ukraine's long-range strike drone systems Bober and Liutyi were used, specifically the AN-196 developed by the Antonov Design Bureau. The footage is quite impressive. We saw a video of a Liutyi drone striking the target, along with other models of Ukrainian strike drones.

And two days ago, let me remind you, drone units of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces and the Security Service carried out a strike on the base of Russia's 448th Missile Brigade - the target was the Kliukva site in Russia’s Kursk region, about 100 km from the state border. As for the results of the strikes in the Kursk region, we know there was an ammunition detonation. Regarding the strikes on Shuya, no information has been received yet. It is known that barracks were reportedly hit. I hope the outcome of the strike will be more effective.

But in any case, it’s true that Ukrainian long-range weapons, drone systems, and FPV drones are currently destroying a significant amount of enemy equipment and personnel on the front line. Still, we must not forget about artillery, which remains extremely important and cannot be fully replaced by drones.

The quantity of ammunition used by Russian forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces plays a crucial role here. Yesterday, an interesting study was released by the UK’s Open Source Centre, which analyzed the supply of ammunition from North Korea to Russia.

Analysts from this organization examined all shipments made from North Korea using container ships to two Russian ports between September 2023 and March 2025. They tracked the transfer of as many as 16,000 containers. In total, this means that Russia received between four and six million artillery shells from North Korea over the course of 20 months.

If we’re talking about a yearly estimate, that’s around 2.8 to 3.8 million shells. These are significant numbers, considering that Russia itself produces just over 2 million large-caliber shells per year. We know that North Korean shells are not high-quality, but even in that condition, they still pose a systemic threat.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, recently stated that the current ammunition usage ratio on the front line is one to two in favor of Russia, although earlier this advantage was significantly greater.

This raises the question: what’s the situation with ammunition for Ukraine’s Defense Forces? For now, we can refer to the following statements. In particular, we know that back in March, EU foreign affairs representative Kaja Kallas said that Brussels considers it realistic to supply Ukraine with around 2 million shells this year. And just recently, she also stated that nearly 1.3 million of these shells are already available for delivery to Ukraine. This marks significant progress compared to last year.

We also know about the Czech initiative, through which over 1 million shells were delivered to the Ukrainian Armed Forces last year. This year, the Czech Republic plans to continue the program, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces are expected to receive around 1.6 million shells.

These are significant figures - they still fall somewhat short of Russia’s, but progress is evident, especially when we also consider Ukraine’s attempts to produce ammunition domestically. However, there are complications. Just last week, we published a piece about how an agreement between the Czechoslovak Group - a major Czech ammunition manufacturer - and the Ukrainian company Ukrainian Armor has yet to be implemented, because the Defense Procurement Agency has not contracted the ammunition that the Ukrainian company is ready to supply.

Overall, the plan was to produce 100,000 shells this year and 300,000 next year. In any case, the Defense Ministry’s failure to contract these volumes seems, to put it mildly, rather strange.

Will U.S. sell weapons to Ukraine?

And then we will talk about what Ukraine's partners supply the country with. How to ensure cooperation with European partners, who now look much more reliable than the United States, which, according to the Bild, refuses to sell us Patriot systems even for money.

This information, in my opinion, is quite critical, given that there was an option that if the United States did not supply its own weapons as part of previous packages or new decisions, then the use of frozen Russian assets or obtaining funds from Ukraine's partners and buying American weapons with them looked quite realistic.

But so far, the first media publications indicate that even this format does not quite suit the United States, which is actually a completely inadequate policy on the part of Ukraine's partners, in my opinion. 

Situation on the frontline

In general, over the past few days, it seems that the dynamics of combat clashes has somewhat decreased. There were statistics where the number of combat clashes on the front line decreased to a hundred combat clashes for several days in a row.

Against the backdrop of 250 or 150 clashes, this does look like a decrease in intensity. But in any case, we understand that this is due, on the one hand, to Russia's significant losses, probably regrouping, although in many areas, even along with manpower, Russian troops have begun to use armored vehicles more and more actively.

These attempts can be explained, first of all, by the fact that Russia is now trying to capture as much of Ukrainian territory as possible, potentially preparing for more territory to be under Russian control, given the likely further negotiations.

But in fact, we clearly realize that Russia is not systematically set up for any negotiations. And now it is implementing a long-term strategy of attrition, where it is trying to put pressure along the entire length of the front line by using its superiority in manpower. If there is a temporary decrease in intensity on the front line, it is in fact really temporary.

On the other hand, Russian troops are increasing the use of guided aerial munitions, in particular. The dynamics show that the number of guided bombs that Russian forces are starting to drop on Ukrainian positions is increasing significantly. A few days ago, there were even peak figures of about 294 guided bombs that were dropped on Ukrainian positions in a day.

This indicates that Russian forces are attempting to deploy the weapons they consider most effective. And it is true — Ukrainian forces currently cannot intercept such munitions. Given that Russia’s production of guided bombs is increasing, with plans to manufacture 70,000 of them this year, these weapons will remain a key component of Russia’s combat operations along the frontline.

As for Ukraine’s response, the focus is primarily on strengthening the country’s air defense, as mentioned earlier, and on finding ways to counter the missile carriers — a task that remains extremely difficult. Ukraine is also working to identify and strike the basing sites or warehouses where the guided bombs are stored, as this is one way to reduce Russia’s ability to use these weapons.

In any case, it is clear that the supply of weapons and military equipment remains critically important for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Just recently, it was announced that Ukraine is developing new air defense systems that could significantly enhance the country’s capabilities, including the development of a strategic missile system.

In fact, the advancements currently being made in Ukraine’s defense industry are largely building on the foundation of earlier developments and existing technological potential.

First of all, we know that the Ukrainian design bureau Luch — renowned for developing and producing Neptune missiles and a range of anti-tank missile systems — is also working on projects related to the creation of a medium-range air defense missile system. This system is based on the bureau’s existing technological developments. Additionally, Pivdenmash is involved in similar efforts, with its own projects related to air defense systems.

However, despite statements from Ukrainian political and military leaders suggesting that Ukraine could develop a system comparable to the Patriot, I believe this is somewhat of an exaggeration. Achieving such a capability will require close cooperation with international partners, which remains critically important.

“2025 remains Putin's last chance”

Next, we will discuss what is happening on the front line, how to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses, and how to deepen cooperation with Europe. Mykhailo Samus, co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information and head of the New Geopolitics Research Network, shared his insights on these issues.

It appears that the dynamics on the front line are slowing down somewhat. Although Russia continues to use armored vehicles and is making advances in certain areas, Ukrainian forces are carrying out counterattacks in other sectors. As a result, there seems to be a certain balancing of forces and capabilities across the front.

“The practical situation on the battlefield shows a certain balance. But if you look at the intentions and plans of Putin, the Kremlin, Russia to demonstrate to the U.S. administration and personally to Trump that Russia is winning this war, the Russian army will try to continue these intense attacks. And what we have seen over the last few days is that the Russians have tried to launch mechanized assaults, not just so-called 'meat waves.' Therefore, I think that in the near future, the Russians will continue to make intensive attempts in the Sumy direction, and even try to enter the subversive forces in the Chernihiv direction. Obviously, Kupiansk, the Lyman direction will be active, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and the other directions. All of these will be very active in trying to 'probe' Ukraine's defense. I am sure that this will not bring any result to the Russian army, but the fact that the intensity may increase again is certain. Because in fact, 2025 is the last chance for Putin to demonstrate that they can show something on the battlefield,” he said. 

At the same time, the military expert believes that the results will be minimal and that this summer, despite all their efforts, Russia will not be able to achieve its goals. Russia continues to demonstrate and declare during its contacts with the American side its intention to seize all the territories it has claimed in its constitution, attempting to legitimize its ambitions based on the so-called "situation on the ground."

“But it won't work, and that's why, in my opinion, the most active tool or the most active way to put pressure on Ukraine, to demand that Ukraine surrender, and to put pressure on the American administration to demonstrate the strength of Russia's position will be ballistic missile attacks on civilians, on Ukrainians. So this problem of not having enough Patriot systems opens up a window of opportunity for the Russians to terrorize Ukrainians and civilians. Because, once again, occupying one more village on the frontline will hardly impress Trump. But if you kill dozens of civilians, Trump will react to it in one way or another. It actually annoys him all the time. In fact, he speaks directly: 'Why hasn't Ukraine surrendered yet, they're asking me for missiles, you shouldn't have started the war if you can't fight against an enemy 20 times stronger.' These narratives demonstrate, in principle, what the Russians will be working on: terrorizing Ukrainian cities and, at the same time, trying to make the most of the last chance in 2025 to break the Ukrainian front,” believes Mykhailo Samus. 

I mentioned earlier that European partners seem to be stepping up their efforts to supply Ukraine with ammunition, but there are bureaucratic mazes in other areas that somewhat reduce the effectiveness of European countries in providing Ukraine with military assistance. The military expert explained whether there are other formats of interaction with European partners, including new formats that will overcome these barriers and ensure more effective cooperation with Ukraine in the supply of weapons, the creation of new projects related to weapons and training. 

"There are a lot of plans, a white paper has been released, and new proposals have been put forward, with the current composition of the European Commission being absolutely pro-Ukrainian. There are many different strategies. In fact, the so-called 'porcupine concept' is to turn Ukraine into a powerful state, the attack on which would be so costly that an aggressor would not even attempt it. However, I would like to point out that a lot of time has been lost. The war has been ongoing since 2014, yet the European defense industry was mostly focused on export projects and paid little attention to the threat from Russia. As a result, production capacities were not increased. Similarly, after 2022, although Europeans seemed to engage more actively, only now are they beginning to realize that the production of, for example, long-range missiles remains at a minimal level — there is no mass production of hundreds of missiles per month. There is absolutely no sign of that happening, and it certainly won't be achieved this year. The same goes for anti-aircraft missile systems. If we talk about SAMP/T, which theoretically could replace Patriot systems, we are still only talking about a few units produced per year — and I believe I'm being optimistic," he said.

Mykhailo Samus pointed out that while there are indeed many plans and mechanisms seemingly ready, all of them are aimed at a longer-term horizon — roughly by 2030.

"Today, unfortunately, Ukraine's defense industry, despite all the problems and challenges we are well aware of, is showing more progress than the entire European defense industry combined. Because even though everything seems clear — the problems and shortcomings of the European defense sector — and even though it seems solutions have been found, we realize that launching a factory or building a new missile production facility is not a matter of weeks, but months, or even years. It requires investments that will only start to materialize in the near future. And even then, it demands significant effort and, again, quite a long period to actually get the whole system fully operational," he said.

“Ukrainian corps can become the core of the future European Armed Forces”

The Consortium for Defense Information and Mykhailo Samus have repeatedly stated the need to create a European Army, or rather a structure that can integrate the potential of European states. This involves both forces and means. The means are the equipment we have discussed, and the forces are the ability of units of different armies to interact effectively. Nowadays, Ukraine is talking about creating corps. Mykhailo Samus explained whether the corps initiative could be made a pan-European one, where to find common ground with European countries to get some synergy in this area.

“When we talk about all these programs of the European defense industry and when we talk about 800 billion, 150 billion, and so on, we mention the seemingly huge amounts that Europe is ready to spend on the defense industry. One question remains: who will be the customer for this equipment, weapons, research and production of new equipment or missiles, or anti-aircraft missile systems? After all, we keep saying that Ukraine needs it, but who else needs it but Ukraine? Will the French Ministry of Defense order it, or will the Italian Ministry of Defense order it? Obviously, if the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Europe and the Ministry of Defense of Europe are not created, roughly speaking, then it is impossible. Not even the European Union, but Europe, because Ukraine, Norway, and the United Kingdom are not members of the European Union, but they are very active participants in all defense military processes. And so, in fact, the question really arises here: who is the customer, who will determine the volumes, who will control the production and delivery of all these weapons. Perhaps even the national components of the countries participating in the new format, but there must still be an integrator. Absolutely right,” he said.

The military expert believes that the corps will save Ukraine in the summer with their synergistic capabilities, preventing Russian forces from breaking through the front. 

“This is one message, indeed, I think that Ukrainian corps, as independent units, combat units, can become the core of the future European Armed Forces. That is, on the basis of the already existing Ukrainian corps, which will have capabilities that have been tested in modern conditions, on a modern battlefield. This includes the doctrine of using drones, the doctrine of using new electronic warfare systems, and a new approach to warfare in terms of integration of information flows, command and control, new means of destruction, and so on, which will probably become the core on which the future European Armed Forces will be built. Although, of course, there must also be political will on the part of the European countries themselves. I think that perhaps these processes, for example, if the process of creating the so-called deterrence forces, which would seem to have a certain role in a hypothetical ceasefire, is intensified, and these European deterrence forces could be located in Ukraine. They can become, together with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, our corps, the prototype of the new European Armed Forces. But again, a political component is needed here, the political will of the European countries,” believes Mykhailo Samus. 

He also commented on the information that the United States was not very optimistic about Ukraine’s proposal to purchase Patriot or other weapons from them. 

“To be honest, I would assume that the United States will no longer supply us with weapons and military equipment. At least during the Trump administration. This is a basic scenario. There may be changes in a positive direction. For example, if we are talking about a situation where Russia will really irritate Trump. He will fail in his efforts, Witkoff will fail, and then certain parties within the Trumpist and Republican parties will say: “If we keep going in this direction, we're going to have a disaster in the '26 congressional elections, and we have to do something. And so let's at least help Ukraine with Patriot, because it's not an offensive weapon, there's no problem at all.” And it could be even worse, when Trump can stop the assistance that has been going on since the Biden administration. Therefore, for now, I would still see a basic scenario of continuing to implement these Biden aid packages, and there will most likely be no new aid packages. Although, again, there are seemingly positive signals regarding the signing or conclusion of this agreement on rare earth metals. Perhaps this will help us find a way to a more positive development of relations with Trump,” said Mykhailo Samus, head of the New Geopolitics Research Network and co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information.