Russia's victory formula hinges on humiliating Ukraine

1. To begin with, it is worth recalling that the current negotiation process is taking place exactly as Keith Kellogg described it in his article America First, Russia, & Ukraine, published in April 2024. According to this plan, to end the war, Trump must pressure both sides, alternately threatening either to stop all aid to Ukraine or, conversely, to sharply increase it while adding sanctions. This is precisely what he has been doing for most of 2025.

This nature of the negotiation process determines its cyclical character. For example, we are now seeing the completion of a cycle that began two months ago with 'Witkoff's 28 points.' Putin's launch of an Oreshnik missile somewhere in the Lviv region essentially drew a line under this cycle.

2. Although the negotiations have hit a wall over the "territorial question," this issue itself is of secondary importance in this war.

"Putin is not fighting for territories. The question of whether Kramatorsk or Melitopol belongs to whom has never been "the root cause of the conflict." Therefore, Putin's escalation of the territorial question evidently has a different purpose."

Ukraine's surrender of territories not occupied by the Russians is meant to be perceived by Ukrainians as a national humiliation. At least this is what Putin is counting on, since humiliation is in any case part of the Russian formula for victory. Therefore, it is fundamentally unimportant how much territory exactly the Ukrainians surrender: all five regions that Putin considers "his own," or only one of them. Putin decided that one Donetsk region would be sufficient for these purposes (at least this is what The New York Times wrote at the end of December) and proposed this as his "concession" to end the war. 

According to the Kremlin's calculations, Ukraine's surrender of territories without a fight will lead to a deep internal crisis that could escalate into a civil war. If such a crisis develops simultaneously with an election campaign, which even in peacetime usually leads to a division of society, the probability of civil war will be even higher.

"Therefore, what Putin is trying to present as a "territorial question" is actually a discussion about how difficult it will be for Ukraine to emerge from one war without plunging into another."

3. Last week's Oreshnik strike showed that the Russians are not satisfied with how this negotiation cycle is unfolding for them. This is precisely why at the end of the year, an "attack" by Ukraine on Putin's dacha was fabricated, to which the missile strike toward the border with Poland was the response.

Simultaneously, the U.S. administration turned its attention to other issues that are also painful for Putin. The special operation to overthrow the president of Venezuela and a possible invasion of Iran concern not just political allies of the Kremlin, but countries that have helped Russia circumvent sanctions. The Americans' seizure of Russian tankers, the return to discussion of Lindsey Graham's bill, and the open disregard for Russian interests demonstrate that the Americans also consider this negotiation cycle completed.

Dmytro Kuleba in a recent interview suggested that "the next flare-up of the negotiation process will be at the end of February." It is difficult to be certain about specific timeframes, but the fact that there are many more such cycles ahead seems quite obvious.

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About the author. Mykola Kniazhytskyi, journalist, Ukrainian lawmaker.

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