Paradoxes behind Istanbul talks

1. One cannot ignore the paradox of Russia’s completely different delegations — the one that attended meetings with the Americans and the one currently declared for the Istanbul talks. The composition is entirely different. This implies that either then, now, or perhaps both times, Russia is “playing dumb” — meaning it had (or still has) completely different objectives than genuinely negotiating an end to the war.

2. As for the “Istanbul delegation,” alongside the odd figure of Medinsky — who has been engaged in pseudo-historical justifications for Russia’s war against Ukraine (in a manner reminiscent of The Sorrows of Young Werther) and who famously cut up his bank cards on camera in 2022 to show Russia wasn’t afraid of sanctions — the presence of two “military wing” representatives at least implies the possibility that the demarcation line (for a potential land-based truce) will be on the agenda.

3. Beyond the composition of the delegation — which Russia appears to have intentionally downgraded, possibly to avoid being in a position to make high-level decisions — what truly matters is what will actually be discussed at the talks. The stated positions of Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. regarding the need for a 30-day ceasefire suggest that the agenda should focus specifically on issues related to a ceasefire — not on Russia’s so-called “root causes,” whether those voiced in recent months or those heard back in March–April 2022.

The legal status of territories and the reduction of Ukraine’s military capabilities do not fall within the scope of a ceasefire discussion. 

One can only hope that the talks in Istanbul — even if they don’t result in an immediate decision — will at least become a transitional point: either toward a ceasefire or toward further sanctions pressure on Russia.