On the eve of a 30-day ceasefire

So, what conclusions can we draw, and what predictions can we make?

1. Currently, in Russian society, there is a clearly defined group of about 30-35% of ultra-patriots who want the war to continue, and 60-70% of a silent majority who want the war to end (the liberation of Kursk would be a full victory for them).
2. At least half of the active ultra-patriots are quite critical of Putin and his regime. Of course, they currently lack agency and a clearly defined leader. Their only idea is to continue the war for the sake of future glory (to avoid being humiliated again). However, in the 7-10 year time frame (the maximum period for power transition), this group will not only survive but transform into a significant political force carrying a deep sense of grievance (in Russian realities—passionate resentment) over any decision other than the complete destruction of Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Putinism has largely grown from a similar resentment.
3. It is very important to note that Putin’s inner circle, although completely loyal to him, thinks in terms of power transition. When it comes to further peace negotiations, they base their approach on three factors:

• How it will affect their material status now
• How it may impact their future political prospects
• How it will affect the duration of Putin’s peaceful and prosperous rule (this point largely overlaps with the previous one, but there are still differences in logic: Putin’s logic of eternal rule without announcing a successor and the logic of the elites preparing for transition)
• Sadly for us, there is no one in Putin's circle willing to speak out loud about ending the special military operation. To use an analogy from history, which I dislike, there is no Mikoyan who would speak out against Khrushchev’s decisions during the height of the Cuban missile crisis.

However paradoxical it may sound, the main promoter of a peace agreement right now could only be Putin. Let me remind you that Russia’s national idea is: "Putin should rule for as long as possible and die as late as possible in the president's chair." He is willing to enter into such an agreement if it ensures him a long and prosperous rule. Therefore, much will depend on how his inner circle behaves: whether they will scare Putin with the destabilization of the system (appealing to the 30% of ultra-patriots) or, on the contrary, calm him by emphasizing the support of the 70% silent majority and warning about the very real collapse of oil exports if he rejects peace.

However, under any circumstances, Russia is already preparing not for a truce, but for negotiations on the substance of peace. The main challenges are as follows:

• The Russians will bargain with Iran and North Korea in exchange for concessions on Ukraine.
• The Russians will raise the financial stakes in their deal with the Americans (increasing its financial attractiveness).
• The Russians will attempt to destabilize the situation in Ukraine through certain information leaks and possible provocations.
• The Russians may attempt to carry out terrorist attacks under the Ukrainian flag (the likelihood is minimal, but we need to be prepared for this).

Separately, we must consider China, which, in the event of a 30-day truce, is likely to get seriously involved. There are two possible ways this involvement could happen: either alongside Russia or in a bilateral game with the U.S. (I will try to write more extensively about China’s role in the coming days).

Source

About the author. Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.