Kremlin’s ambitious revenue targets threatened by tax arrears 

The author of the Resurgam channel and a foreign relations expert believes this signals growing stress in the real economy — one that rising taxes may not be able to offset.

For 2025, Kremlin officials planned to receive 30.2 trillion rubles in non-oil and gas revenues — primarily from taxes, duties, and other internal sources. This target is 2.2 trillion rubles higher than the 2024 plan. Resurgam notes that this projection assumes strong compliance and economic resilience that no longer reflect the reality on the ground.

To achieve this growth in non-oil and gas revenues, the Kremlin is raising multiple tax rates and fees:

• Corporate tax will increase from 20% to 25%.
• Extraction duties are rising sharply: iron ore (+15%), potash fertilizers (+130%), and phosphate fertilizers (+100%).
• Tourist taxes will be raised.
• Recycling fees will increase by 20%.
• Traffic fines will rise by 25–50%.

And more measures are on the table.

However, many economists argue that even these aggressive tax hikes will not be enough. Resurgam highlights that, by the end of Q3 2025, economic growth has slowed substantially — and this slowdown is threatening revenue flows that had been steadily increasing earlier in the year.

Due to a drop in oil and gas revenues, Muscovy has already slashed its budget’s revenue side by 1.8 trillion rubles — from 40.3 trillion to 38.5 trillion. But Resurgam points to recent figures indicating another likely downward revision, driven by disappointing non-oil and gas revenue collection in the second half of the year.

Further stressing the budget, data from the Audit Chamber show that in Q1 2025, company arrears on insurance contributions — including social and medical insurance — nearly doubled year-on-year, jumping from 179 billion to 352 billion rubles. These arrears now account for 12.5% of the 2.8 trillion rubles collected for insurance funds in that quarter alone.

Moscow analysts cited by Resurgam warn that if this trend continues, the Pension Fund will need additional government support to meet its obligations — including pensions, social benefits, and health insurance. This would require emergency infusions beyond what is already budgeted.

And yet, two-thirds of the National Welfare Fund is already depleted, with the remaining third ring-fenced to cover oil price volatility. Resurgam notes that this leaves little fiscal space for new, unplanned expenditures — especially as the government has failed for over a year to provide relief to the coal and automotive sectors, both facing their most severe crisis since the 1990s.

In short, Resurgam argues, Russia’s 2025 budget is more a political signal than a credible financial plan — and the pressure on the system is only growing.