Strategic infantilism: EU once again ignores Black Sea realities

This material was prepared in partnership with the Consortium for Defence Information (CDI), which unites Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and aims to strengthen information support and analytical capabilities in the areas of national security, defense, and geopolitics.

The co-founders of the consortium are: Serhiy Zgurets, Director of the Defense Express information and consulting company; Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies; Mykhailo Samus, Director of the New Geopolitics Research Network; and Oleksii Izhak, an expert at the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

In the last days of May, the European Union presented a new strategic initiative — the Strategic Approach to Security in the Black Sea. What does this document reveal? Unfortunately, it reflects Europe’s reluctance to take responsibility for regional security and its unpreparedness to confront the Russian threat. The strategy remains more of a declarative text than a real instrument for influencing the balance of power in the region. 

However, the EU has a chance to change course. To do so, it must finally acknowledge the reality: that Russia is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine and is irreversibly dismantling the system of international law in the Black Sea–Azov region — and act accordingly. Without this, new European strategic initiatives will again become nothing more than naïve dreams with no prospect of implementation.

European strategy: an illusory attempt to forget the Black Sea catastrophes of 2014 and 2022

The Strategic Approach to Security in the Black Sea has an ambitious title, but unfortunately lacks realistic models for achieving European interests in the Black Sea. The document outlines six priorities: strengthening regional cooperation, preserving the environment and biodiversity, developing the “blue economy,” advancing digital transformation, joint risk management, and enhancing institutional capacity. The core message is to ensure stability and inclusivity, avoiding “dividing lines.”

However, this humanitarian and economic approach ignores the reality of war and the transformation of the Black Sea into a zone of active hostilities. Most concerning is the emphasis on “inclusive dialogue”—effectively inviting Russia to cooperate, despite it being the aggressor and the source of strategic instability in the region. This is not only a political but also a moral mistake. It undermines trust in the EU as a security actor.

Officially, the strategy declares its intention to implement three flagship initiatives “to unlock the Black Sea region’s growth potential” while responding to current security challenges:

• The Black Sea Maritime Security Initiative envisions the creation of a Black Sea maritime security hub. It aims to enhance maritime safety, protect critical maritime infrastructure and the marine environment, and promote regional cooperation on demining and countering environmental and maritime security risks.
• The Infrastructure Integration Development Program, aligned with the extended network of trans-European transport, energy, and digital corridors, aims to build corresponding networks. This will allow the Black Sea region to serve as a key corridor between Europe and Central Asia via the South Caucasus, boosting economic growth and competitiveness.
• Enhancing preparedness of coastal countries and blue economy sectors will help Black Sea nations overcome the consequences of war-related environmental destruction, adapt to climate risks, and harness opportunities for sustainable development.

The strategy sets out three key objectives:

1. Systematic demining of waters after Russia’s massive mining campaigns in 2022–2024.
2. Combating Russia’s “shadow fleet,” which violates sanctions, transports oil and arms outside regulatory control.
3. Ensuring freedom of navigation—particularly through humanitarian corridors from Ukrainian ports.

In other words, this is essentially a “post-war” stabilization plan for the Black Sea, rather than a strategy to counter Russian military aggression—which will remain the main source of regional insecurity for years to come. One potential positive is the strategy’s provision for dual-use infrastructure—bridges, ports, logistics hubs, and airfields that can enable rapid deployment of military equipment, personnel, and logistics in case of escalation. For Ukraine, this could mean faster transportation of Western military aid, including heavy equipment, ammunition, and air defense systems, via Black Sea logistical hubs such as Odesa, Izmail, and Constanța.

Another important aspect is the control over ownership of critical infrastructure. This involves preventing situations in which strategic ports, airports, or logistics hubs fall into the hands of legal entities affiliated with hostile states or dual-control companies. This aligns with the EU’s new security concept, where economic ties and investments are considered potential threats if not thoroughly vetted by counterintelligence.

It’s worth noting that the strategy explicitly refers to Ukraine’s security as “an integral part of Black Sea stability.” This constitutes political recognition of Ukraine’s key role in European and specifically Black Sea security. The potential use of a Maritime Security Center to monitor compliance with ceasefire conditions is even mentioned—indicating the EU’s prospective involvement in future peacekeeping or guarantee mechanisms.

At the same time, all these provisions are still seen as declarations and wishes unsupported by resources. Moreover, the impression arises that the strategy was developed in isolation from the EU’s core defense and security documents, particularly ReArm Europe. The absence of concrete measures to deter Russia in the Black Sea—such as developing defense-industrial cooperation or building modern naval forces based on Ukraine’s experience (the strategy does not even mention Ukraine’s successful naval innovations, like maritime drones)—indicates a lack of coordination between EU institutions shaping Black Sea policy and those advancing the EU’s defense sector. Consequently, while EU leaders (France, the UK, Germany) discuss joint defense capabilities at a strategic level, this aspect is not mentioned at all in the Black Sea context.

Furthermore, the EU’s Black Sea strategy says nothing about financial resources for implementation. Given the European bureaucracy’s track record, this implies that the strategy’s list of ideas is just a wishlist far from practical realization, especially considering the separate complexities of EU budgeting.

Ukraine’s maritime revolution: a new A2/AD zone in the Black Sea

Meanwhile, Ukraine has already changed the geopolitical dynamics in the Black Sea—not in theory but in practice. Maritime drones developed by the Defense Intelligence Directorate and the Security Service of Ukraine have become symbols of a new era in naval warfare. Systems like Magura V5 and V7 and Sea Baby didn’t just attack ships—they created a new strategic reality in which Russia was forced to relocate its Black Sea Fleet from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, and its operations—particularly in the western Black Sea—have been put on hold. What’s more, the destruction of a Russian Su-30 fighter jet by a Magura V7 naval drone finalized the creation of a Ukrainian A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) zone for Russian forces in the Black Sea. This marks the first such development since World War II and constitutes a genuinely new military-strategic reality.

Additionally, the actions of Ukraine’s Defense Forces in the Black Sea have led to a paradoxical situation: while from 2014 to 2022 Russia referred to the Black Sea as a “Russian lake” (due to complete dominance, dismantling of maritime international law, and the absence of any NATO or EU response), after February 2022 (when Ukrainian forces began decisive operations and destroyed a significant portion of the Russian fleet), the Russian Navy locked itself in Novorossiysk and doesn’t dare to venture into the western Black Sea. In other words, Ukraine has demonstrated in practice what an effective NATO and EU strategy in the Black Sea should look like. Unfortunately, the EU’s published strategy doesn’t acknowledge the new military-strategic reality at sea, nor does it mention Ukraine’s successful experience.

Russia’s response: copying the Ukrainian model and hybrid escalation

What are the consequences of such an approach? A weak EU strategy could signal to Russia that Europe still won’t take concrete steps to counter Russian aggression in the Black Sea. This means Moscow may quickly try to reassert its influence in the region. A signal of this is Russia’s creation of its own naval drones and, on their basis, a new asymmetric concept for its Black Sea Fleet. In early May, Russia established special drone units (aerial, maritime, and ground) across all its fleets (Black Sea, Baltic, Pacific, and Northern) responsible for the development and use of drones in naval operations. This means Russia may soon begin mass replication of Ukraine’s maritime drone approach (its drone prototypes were already developed in 2023–2024). If this scenario unfolds, Russia’s use of maritime drones to attack civilian shipping and economic projects on the Black Sea (and possibly also the Baltic Sea) shelf will present new threats that EU and NATO countries must address immediately—with concentrated doctrinal and industrial efforts.

Unfortunately, this prospect is not considered in the EU’s Black Sea strategy at all.

Moreover, the Kremlin may return to its tried-and-true hybrid tactics: “exercises,” “emergency operations for maritime security,” blockades of sea corridors, sabotage of underwater infrastructure. This already happened from 2014 to 2022, when Russia regularly created “exclusion zones” in the Black Sea under the pretext of military drills. Without active EU and NATO response, this scenario may repeat—with high probability.

Another important aspect that deserves attention is the inclusion of the Black Sea issue in the negotiation process and any potential ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. If the ceasefire only applies to the land front, it would open the door for Russia to remilitarize the Black Sea. Since Ukraine would be unable to use naval drones to deter the Russian fleet (such actions could be interpreted as a “violation of the ceasefire”), the Russian Black Sea Fleet could seize the opportunity to return to the western part of the Black Sea. Under the guise of “peace initiatives,” the Kremlin would gain time and space to restore its naval capabilities.

Furthermore, the provisions of the Montreux Convention must be taken into account. In the event of a ceasefire and the removal of formal grounds for restrictions, Turkey would be obligated to reopen the Bosporus – granting Russia the opportunity to transfer ships from the Baltic, Northern, and even Pacific Fleets into the Black Sea. This would significantly shift the balance of power in a direction unfavorable to Ukraine – as well as to Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, NATO, and the EU.

Ukraine’s strategic red lines

Given this, Ukraine must clearly set out its strategic requirements regarding the Black Sea in any ceasefire negotiations with Russia.

First, the Black Sea must be included in the terms of the truce. Failing to address the maritime component would pave the way for the reestablishment of Russian dominance in the region.

Second, the demilitarization of Crimea must be a key demand. Without the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and naval forces from Crimea, Russia will retain the capacity to continuously threaten regional stability and security.

Third, there must be a legally binding prohibition on Russian Black Sea Fleet military activity in the western part of the Black Sea.

Fourth, the transfer of ships from other Russian fleets into the Black Sea must be prevented. This requires the establishment of a permanent monitoring mechanism under the auspices of NATO or the EU.

Finally, there is a need to initiate the creation of an international monitoring mission to track ceasefire violations not only on land, but also at sea and in the air.