How realistic is Russia's collapse?

And in fact, this is the key to understanding Russian politics, the state, and society as a whole.

Since at least the 17th century, Russia has followed a consistent trade model: exporting raw materials and low-level processed goods in large volumes in exchange for Western high-tech products.

The specific types of raw materials have shifted over time — from yarn, potash, and borax, to iron and grain, and now to oil and gas. That last transition — to oil and gas — has fundamentally reshaped Russian society and its internal dynamics.

The point is that producing and exporting oil and gas involves a very different structure of the social groups engaged in the process — especially when compared to something like grain exports. Four small but distinct groups are involved in the oil and gas cycle, forming a clear hierarchy:

• security and political "roof" (at the top);
• financial infrastructure;
• transportation;
• production (at the bottom).

Together, these four groups make up only a few percent of the population, but they generate the majority of the country's income. Everyone else is essentially dependent on this de facto state-forming elite.

"That’s why Russia, as a "gas station with missiles", cannot be governed by anything other than the current authoritarian rule of FSB — which has gradually absorbed and subordinated the oil and gas sectors."

In this setup, the regions have only nominal power. Their main job is to maintain order in territories controlled by state or quasi-state monopolies.

Poor regions have no reason to leave the system, they're fully dependent on it. How would they even survive without regular "federal" subsidies!?

The regions that contribute more to the budget might want to break away — but they don’t control the main source of their income, so who’s going to let them go?

So, for any real change to happen, there has to be some kind of rupture — something that makes at least a few regions decide that breaking away is now practical, worthwhile, and relatively safe, whether for economic or security reasons.

But what could actually break this socio-economic system?

I see two possible scenarios, with plenty of variations in between.

1. Long-term (15–20 years): The system could collapse if global demand for fossil fuels drops sharply — a likely result of the green transition, which some forecasts suggest could become essential for humanity’s survival. Russia has little else to trade at scale.

"That’s why, as I’ve written before, Russia needs Ukraine now more than ever: when fossil fuel income drops, it hopes to have as many geopolitical assets as possible, because geopolitical influence can also be traded."

2. Short-term (in the coming years): The system could fall apart if the state’s expenses, especially military spending, start to seriously outpace fossil fuel revenues. In that case, the "gas station with missiles" simply goes bankrupt. That hasn’t happened yet. Whether it will depends on a mix of unpredictable factors.

Either way, the oil and gas sector, along with the social hierarchy built around it, is, for now, the real backbone of the empire. Its strength, and the social model it has created — one where it’s not the people who build the state, but the oil, gas, and power elite who maintain control by feeding the rest just enough — must be factored into any serious scenario about Russia’s future.

Source

About the author. Oleksii Panych, philosopher, member of the Ukrainian Center of the International PEN Club, blogger.

The editorial staff does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.