Mistakes, lack of equipment and experience prevent Ukraine’s counteroffensive from delivering powerful blow to Russia

Business Insider interviewed war experts on why Ukraine's opening move in the counteroffensive was unsuccessful.

"The first phase of this operation was not a success," Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute who just came back from a research trip to Ukraine where he and other experts engaged Ukrainian officials, officers, and service members, said. 

That doesn't mean that the offensive has failed, he clarified, offering context to his judgment of the first round. "The offensive is still going on. Ukraine still has reserves that have not been committed, but the initial phase wasn't a success for a variety of reasons."

Ukraine, in particular, banked on a two-pronged strategy: build new combat brigades for a future counteroffensive while keeping the most experienced warriors in place to defend the line against Russia's winter offensive. It is only partially repaid.

Ukrainian troops halted Russia's attack, but they did it without proper rest and refit opportunities.

As a result, the new brigades trained on Western weapons were expected to play a "decisive role" in the counteroffensive, but "their performance thus far has not lived up to expectations," according to Lee.

For the counteroffensive, Ukraine deployed nine brigades outfitted with NATO weapons. While the Russians changed into a mainly defensive position that took months to fortify, these units were required to learn new systems, adopt new tactics, and create unit cohesiveness in a relatively short amount of time.

Minefields, anti-tank barriers, and trenches, as well as artillery, aviation, and anti-tank guided missiles, protect the Russian lines.

When the new Ukrainian brigades sent troops and equipment into combat at the start of the counteroffensive, they did so with a less coherent approach marked by miscommunication, deficiencies in reconnaissance and targeting, and poor coordination that did not work out as well as hoped.

"We saw in the beginning, the first couple of days' offensives, some of the kind of issues that the new brigades had," Lee said, noting that the mistakes were ones "that more experienced brigades likely would not have made."

According to him, in the early days of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, some of the advancing assault units were disoriented, particularly at night, advanced in the wrong direction, and occasionally ran into minefields that hadn't yet been cleared.

In one example, the advance was delayed and occurred during the day rather than at night, reducing the value of the new vehicles' night-vision technology, which the Russians lack for the most part. And the artillery barrage preceded the advance by many hours.

The latter error meant "all these Russian [anti-tank guided missile] teams and the infantry forces were not being suppressed when the actual advance occurred," Lee said. Artillery is frequently employed to confuse defenders and force them to find shelter as armor and infantry troops advance.

While mines had a part in blunting the assault, according to Lee, the initial assaults were mostly repelled by Russian artillery and attack helicopters equipped with anti-tank missiles.

"They often didn't have a plan B or weren't able to seamless execute a plan B after they ran into kind of some of these foreseeable problems," Lee said that the more experienced battalions that held the line during Russia's aborted winter onslaught were likely better prepared.

"They were surprised initially when they made these mistakes," which are not "shocking mistakes," he said.

"In many cases, the time was very critical and really costly because then Russia could respond," Lee said, noting that the Russians kind of learned where the main act, advance would be, and they could adjust their defenses accordingly.

Michael Kofman, a senior Russia specialist at the Center for Naval Analyses who was on Lee's recent trip to Ukraine, agreed.

While Ukraine has done well on defense, particularly defense in depth, throughout Russia's war, he claims that on offense, "the military is not as well organized and not as experienced at scaling offensive operations."

In a series of social media posts summarizing his findings, Franz-Stefan Gady, a modern war expert at the Center for New American Security who also recently returned from Ukraine, argued that one of Ukraine's biggest problems as it attempts to execute its counteroffensive is its inability to conduct effective combined arms operations at scale. 

Ukraine has complained about minefields and a lack of equipment, but he believes this is the most important issue. And Lee's depiction of Ukrainian assault forces advancing towards Russian lines without suppressing artillery fire backs up that conclusion.

Combined arms operations are primarily about combining fighting capabilities to create a single sledgehammer from a box of hammers. Infantry attacks, for example, are supported by mobile shielded weaponry and artillery, as well as, if possible, aviation.

Most countries do not conduct effective combined weapons warfare, and Ukraine lacks both equipment and expertise with this type of combat. So, while Ukraine is making steady progress, it is, as the military minister admitted, behind schedule.

"The lack of necessary equipment and experience, along with the blunders Lee described, saw Ukraine miss its opportunity to strike a heavy blow, to break Russian lines and deliver a powerful first-round hit, but the battle continues," the article says.