U.S. eyes Greenland as strategic asset against Russia, China
For all the drama of the current crisis between the U.S. and Europe regarding Greenland, there is nothing good in it for the Kremlin. Strategically, it is Russia that finds itself at the greatest loss
On one hand, it is good for the Kremlin that in the process of the quarrel, Trump and the Europeans will have no time for Russia and Ukraine.
However, it is already clear now that the result of this crisis will be the strengthening of the U.S. in the Arctic and the acceleration of Europe's militarization. New American missile defense bases in Greenland and the newest missile programs of European countries make the process of Russia's "rising from its knees" not as exciting as the Kremlin had calculated. At the same time, it is already clear now at whom exactly these new missiles will be aimed.
"The Americans directly say that they need Greenland for war with Russia and China, while Europe has no other real invasion risks at all, except for the Russian one."
The same applies to the "root causes of the conflict."
It is no secret to anyone that Russia seeks to normalize relations with the U.S. For this purpose, the Kremlin's special envoy Kirill Dmitriev flew to Davos to participate in negotiations with the American delegation. It is known that the Russians are trying to "buy" the Americans with promises of "wonderful" and "incredible" joint projects, and Dmitriev's task is precisely to promote these projects among the Americans. But when Dmitriev opens the list with the enumeration of potential "wonderful" and "incredible" projects, next to each item it says: "sanctions must be lifted for implementation." Considering that we are talking about EU sanctions, in case of a deepening crisis between Europe and the U.S., lifting them will be practically impossible. In such a situation, the Russians will have to say goodbye to the idea of normalizing relations with the U.S. on their own terms.
By unleashing the war, Putin hoped to thereby advance himself to new roles in Europe and the world. In fact, it was about establishing Russia's veto right on key issues of European countries' development. The failed invasion of Ukraine, which could not be realized in 2022 in those same "three days," put an end to these plans. The change of U.S. president could have given these hopes a second chance, but this chance was completely squandered by Putin last year.
The events of early 2026 have only once again underscored Putin's two main mistakes: the first—that he started the war with Ukraine at all, and the second—that he did not end it in 2025 on the terms that Trump managed to extract from Ukraine and the Europeans. The terms on which Putin will end the war in the future will only be worse for him—regardless of how many additional kilometers of scorched Ukrainian land end up under his occupation.
About the author. Mykola Kniazhytskyi, journalist, Ukrainian lawmaker.
The editorial board does not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of blogs or columns.
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