Ukraine weighs abandoning non-nuclear status: is it on the table?

This is stated in an analytical article by Valentyn Badrak, director of the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies, published by Espreso.

Right now, geopolitical conditions have emerged that truly lead to a reconsideration of Ukraine’s non-nuclear status. And it’s not just about Ukraine—Europe itself now needs this.

“Europe and Britain are genuinely interested in Ukraine building up its nuclear muscle—not only to protect itself, but also to protect Europe and Britain from direct confrontation with the Russian Federation, which by mid-2025 looks much more realistic than it did six months ago,” the expert notes.

He cites the legal aspect of Ukraine acquiring nuclear status. The Putin regime has violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly by moving nuclear weapons into the Republic of Belarus. Thus, in a situation where not only Russia but also other signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum have failed to fulfill their obligations to guarantee Ukraine’s existence as a non-nuclear state, Ukraine has every reason to withdraw from the NPT and to reconsider the non-nuclear choice it made in early 1994. In other words, the legal basis for Ukraine’s accession to the NPT simply disappears. 

At the same time, it would be shortsighted for Ukraine to move toward developing nuclear weapons independently, without the support of partners.

On May 31, British Army Colonel Richard Kemp clearly articulated at the Black Sea Security Forum 2025: Britain must help Ukraine restore its nuclear weapons. According to the colonel, the century-long partnership agreement signed this year between Ukraine and Britain should include official London’s assistance in Kyiv’s development of its own nuclear weapons; otherwise, it is meaningless. “You cannot deter a country with nuclear weapons (i.e., Russia) without nuclear capability, and you cannot deter tactical nuclear weapons without strategic nuclear weapons. It’s just pointless. So I think that part of this declaration should have been a commitment by the United Kingdom to develop tactical nuclear weapons,” he said.

Berlin, through Friedrich Merz, has called for negotiations on nuclear protection with France and Britain, since the American nuclear umbrella—and possibly not just the nuclear one—will cease to cover Europe and Britain.

Valentyn Badrak notes: “During the large-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, Poland has expressed a desire to obtain nuclear status to protect its independence from Russia, and Britain has proven to be the most consistent partner in supporting Ukraine in its resistance to nuclear Russia. Therefore, an alliance with Poland and Britain for joint development of new weapons, including nuclear ones, could look quite plausible. Under certain conditions, the Baltic countries could also join such an alliance.”

He predicts the formation of a Britain–Ukraine–Poland triad to obtain political support for the development of advanced weaponry, including nuclear arms. “This could be one of the realistic scenarios for achieving Europe’s (and Britain’s) defense sufficiency and for Ukraine’s full integration into the Euro-Atlantic defense space. Alongside nuclear weapons development, it would also be possible to jointly develop and produce modern ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000 km or more,” the expert believes, emphasizing that today Ukraine’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not just possible—it is likely.

According to Badrak’s forecast, after the end (or freezing) of the war, a policy similar to Israel’s may become likely—Ukraine would neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear deterrent weapons. From a strategic point of view, this makes sense, given the ineffectiveness of international agreements. At the same time, creating a dirty bomb is not the path for Ukraine. “But the creation of a fourth-generation thermonuclear charge, which does not emit radiation, is an entirely realistic task. Experts believe that such a task can be accomplished in a very short time—up to twelve months. So all we need is a year,” concludes the co-founder of the Defense Information Consortium.