Supplying defective mines to Ukrainian army, use of armored vehicles in war. Serhiy Zgurets’ column

Attack on Murom plant

I'll start with the news that on the night of April 30, drones of the Security Service of Ukraine struck the Murom Instrument Engineering Plant in Russia’s Vladimir region. This enterprise specializes in the production of ignition devices for ammunition, as well as products for the Russian Federation’s Navy and military aviation. Five explosions were heard at the plant. We are waiting for an assessment of the damage based on satellite images.

Defective mines for Ukraine's Armed Forces

Of course, Russia's ammunition depots and production facilities should constantly explode, while we should be increasing the production of high-quality mines and ammunition, in addition to those we already receive from our partners. However, this does not always happen. And here, I cannot help but mention the very loud news that the Security Service of Ukraine has detained several officials suspected of producing defective mortar ammunition for the Armed Forces.

In particular, this concerns the General Director of the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, Leonid Shyman, his first deputy, Oleksiy Kyrychenko, as well as the former head of one of the Ministry of Defense’s military representations, Mykhailo Lashkurenko, and the head of the control group of the relevant Ministry of Defense unit, Yuriy Yaresko. According to the investigation, these individuals deliberately used cheap, low-quality materials in production to reduce costs and make huge profits from state orders. Military officials ignored the identified deficiencies. This was stated in the message from the Security Service of Ukraine.

All four suspects have been taken into custody. In my opinion, this chain is far from complete, but it's something. This story actually began in February 2024, when the Ministry of Defense decided to place a number of significant orders at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant.

The orders primarily included the production of over 250,000 mortar mines, as well as 82 mm mines and 122 mm shells, with a total of 28 billion UAH allocated for all of this. However, when it came to the production of the mines, military officials had previously raised concerns that the plant had problems obtaining critical components.

This primarily concerns explosives and powders that are necessary. There were also questions about the qualified personnel and other factors. Initially, there were concerns from the military, but for some reason, these concerns from the military representatives were later removed. I believe this is one of the issues the investigation will look into – why this happened.

We also understand that, in fact, the leadership of the Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukroboronprom should have been aware of the details of this contract or these contracts, because officials like Herman Smetanin and Oleksandr Kamyshin were aware of the specifics of the contract, all its complexities, and the problems the plant had to address.

But, of course, there are no signatures from Smetanin and Kamyshin on these contracts because, as I think, Ukroboronprom and the Ministry of Strategic Industries primarily operate on the basis of informal agreements. However, when, at the end of 2024, public information revealed that these mines were not detonating or launching, there were explanations from the Ministry of Strategic Industries. When Herman Smetanin spoke in parliament, he stated that the problem was with imported low-quality powders. He claimed this was the only issue causing all these problems and mentioned that 24,000 mines needed to be replaced.

However, just a couple of days before the management of the Pavlograd Chemical Plant was arrested, the Ministry of Strategic Industries released news that in fact, 39,000 mines needed to be replaced, and that the plant had improved its production technology. If we're talking about improved production technology, then the issue was likely not just the powders.

But here's another nuance: if the mines didn’t launch, it was due to poor powders, but why didn’t they detonate?

Here's another interesting detail that we discovered during our conversations with officials. It turns out that the 120mm mines ordered at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant did not have fuses. The mortar fuses for these mines were missing, and therefore, it was decided to replace them with fuses from tank shells.

Tank shell fuses are much more expensive, but they were available in the Ministry of Defense's warehouses, and the Logistics Forces Command transferred them to the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for use in mortar mines. However, it turns out that the speed of a tank shell is four times faster than the speed of a mine exiting the barrel, and as a result, these fuses did not function because they did not transition to combat mode.

But who made such a decision? It turns out that we have a chief designer for ammunition and explosives. He has the authority to make such decisions, but ironically, it turns out that in 2023, the head of the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, Mr. Shyman, was appointed to this position. So, in a way, the circle has closed.

This is an extremely interesting story, and we will be observing the consequences of its investigation. But in any case, we understand that state funds were used inefficiently. Now, we must make up for the losses to ensure that the Armed Forces have high-quality mines. We have enterprises that can actually produce both ammunition and mines.

The issue is that we need to create conditions that allow private enterprises to be more involved in the contracts that were previously exclusively given to the Pavlograd Chemical Plant as the primary contractor for such orders.

Armored vehicles on the battlefield

Next, we will discuss what is happening on the battlefield in other areas, specifically tanks and armored vehicles. In the latest reports, the number of Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles has not increased. For a long time, 8-10% of destroyed heavy armored vehicles have been accounted for.

Is it true that the era of tanks is over? What conclusions can be drawn after three years of active combat? We spoke with Mykola Salamakha, a retired lieutenant colonel and head of projects at the company Enerhiya 2000, which manufactures a range of complex training devices for the Armed Forces and Defense Forces.

Every six months, I ask almost the same question: is the era of tanks really over, since things on the training ground change every six months?

"Unfortunately, the time for using the ammunition that tanks rely on will not pass for quite a while. You cannot replace a tank with a shell speed of over 1.5 kilometers per second, if we’re talking about armor-piercing fin-stabilized projectiles. You cannot replace shells with a speed of 850-900 meters per second, which are high-explosive fragmentation and shaped-charge shells. And you can't replace anti-tank guided missiles with a speed of 300–350 meters per second. Yes, on the battlefield, it is now very difficult to camouflage armored vehicles at all. Because, in the operational depth, on both sides, there are currently more than a hundred drones hanging, which, from a height of 3–4 kilometers, transmit images and can survey up to 50, sometimes up to 100 kilometers deep into the enemy’s territory, providing information to both sides. The same FPV drones now have a range of up to 15 kilometers, which, 3–4 years ago, was the range of artillery, both Ukrainian and Russian," he said

Mykola Salamakha noted that only when Ukraine received a large amount of Western artillery did the range of our artillery increase to 30 km. However, even drones now sometimes reach a range of 30 km.

"And both our forces and Russian forces are successfully using them. There are still not many such drones. And there are also few crews and units capable of using these drones, but over time, this number will grow. And the depth at which armored vehicles will need to be protected, first and foremost from loitering munitions, is increasing. Because all drones — fiber-optic, FPV drones, and drop drones — are classified as loitering munitions in military terminology. The urgent problem now is: first, detecting them in time, and second, using various methods to combat them to protect armored vehicles, logistics, and even personnel," he emphasized.

Drones are even used against a single soldier who appears on the battlefield. And these technologies are developing very quickly.

“Starting with the use, still not widespread, of laser weapons that use lasers. These are physical destruction tools, like the Skynet system, which has shown quite effective results, but these are stationary installations. Sooner or later, they will become mobile. And they will advance further in reducing caliber, increasing the number of detection tools, which will likely include complexes such as radar stations, optical detection and guidance systems. Also, there will probably be systems that can detect sniper fire or mortar flight paths — these are acoustic detection systems. If all of this is combined into a single system, creating a fire control system based on this set, and adding 20mm or 25mm automatic cannons, or even paired systems or 12.7mm caliber machine guns, they can be used directly on the battlefield, with changes made in organizational structures, mechanized or motorized infantry units, or tank units, preparing personnel accordingly.

Including the leadership, which must calculate possible directions of application, the possible time of use, at what lines, and at what stages the enemy might apply it. In other words, if we want to advance, we can't do it with drones alone. Yes, we will be able to destroy to a certain depth, but the enemy will use drones for defense as well. And again, we return to the old saying: ‘Until a soldier's foot steps on the enemy's position, that position is not captured.’ The areas of land that we need to liberate, we will have to physically liberate them,” the expert believes.

There is still a place for tanks; the issue is that a tank doesn’t fight on its own — it needs effective protection from drones, and we must strengthen our armored capabilities. Just six months ago, Mykola Salamakha and I dreamed that leading infantry fighting vehicle manufacturers, which we desperately need, might come to us. So far, that hasn’t happened, and the question arises: isn’t it time we start producing something like the MT-LB or the M113 armored personnel carrier ourselves, considering we need to increase the mechanization of our units?

"Unfortunately, for now, Ukraine is not capable of developing or even producing tanks independently — not even the ones we used to manufacture. As for infantry fighting vehicles, there’s a lot that would have to start from scratch. The experience of operating both Soviet and Western armored vehicles has shown that an infantry fighting vehicle must be significantly better protected than the BMP-1, BMP-2, or even BMP-3. That means at least the level of Bradley M2, A2, Odysseus, or even the Marder — although the Marder is somewhat less protected than the Bradley. Then there’s the CV-90, which weighs nearly 40 tons. So the challenge is that the factories previously involved in tank development and production would need to reorient toward designing and building heavy-class infantry fighting vehicles. It would be better if we draw on the experience of Western countries, since we have gained operational experience, but still need to gain experience in designing and producing such vehicles. Again, this will likely require cooperation in order to first acquire the expertise and technologies," said Mykola Salamakha.

Regarding armored personnel carriers, Ukraine has the BTR-4, but unfortunately, its characteristics fall short of the best Western models.

"There are many factors involved, starting with the fact that Soviet 30mm cannons are inferior to their Western counterparts — whether 20mm, 25mm, 30mm, 35mm, or even 40mm. The gunpowder is worse, the explosives are worse, the technology is worse. Soviet systems lagged at least 20 years behind Western technologies, which is why we’re seeing the results we have today. Currently, we are successfully upgrading BMP-2s and BMP-1s with combat modules developed in Ukraine, like the Spys and Sich modules, but even there, things are far from perfect. Improvements are needed in software, and design changes must be made to both the vehicles and the combat modules in order to increase battlefield performance and effectiveness. And most importantly, both the BMP-1 and BMP-2 are less protected than even the BTR-4. So, it’s absolutely necessary to develop a new vehicle — including a new armored personnel carrier," the expert noted.

Another important issue is the training of personnel, because on one hand, there is the equipment, and on the other hand, trained personnel. The company Enerhiya 2000 is engaged in producing high-quality simulators for a wide range of weapons systems. These include MANPADS, ATGMs, APCs, and IFVs — both Soviet, Ukrainian, and Western models.

"Right now, we’re facing a serious problem — we physically cannot keep up with the military’s needs. It's impossible to develop and produce more than three dynamic full-crew simulators for any specific type of Western equipment per year. This involves software developers, electronics programs, and design challenges. And there’s another very serious issue — unfortunately, we have very few specialists capable of understanding these systems deeply enough to develop algorithms that model the behavior of various Western weapon systems. And without such algorithms, it's extremely difficult to create fully functional simulators," noted Mykola Salamaha.

If we understand that we will be using Western weaponry, this means that as part of military-technical cooperation, we must also discuss establishing partnerships in the development of simulators for these systems, relying on our own defense-industrial capabilities.

"Unfortunately, at the state level, this understanding is still lacking. Everyone is focused solely on acquiring new weapon systems, but when it comes to asking our allies to also provide simulators, that’s overlooked. Firstly, the cost difference between simulators developed and produced in Ukraine and those developed and produced in the West is about an order of magnitude. When a Western combat vehicle costs 3–4–5 million dollars, and a simulator starts at 10 million or more, of course, they’ll opt to buy three combat vehicles instead," the expert said.

The Russians captured a Bradley IFV, analyzed it, and admitted that the Bradley is far superior to their most modern models. Mykola Salamaha explained whether the Russians could use this experience to improve their own equipment or whether it's merely a statement of fact that won’t affect the battlefield reality.

“There’s nothing new in the Bradley IFV over the past 20 years. They (the Russians) already had access to what they are now simply acknowledging. If there’s a 20–30 year technological gap, then you’d have to start from chemistry, metallurgy, training specialists, developing a machine-tool base at the level needed to produce all the components of a Bradley infantry fighting vehicle — and they don’t have that,” said retired lieutenant colonel and armored vehicle expert Mykola Salamaha.