Kremlin’s “miracle weapon”: Separating fact from fiction on Putin’s ICBMs

Contents

1. Historical context: how the “miracle weapon” idea began
2. Kremlin tactics: ICBMs as pressure tools
3. Not a unique tactic: similar examples of intimidation

Espreso explains how Russia uses its so-called "miracle weapon" to intimidate the world and looks back at similar strategies used by totalitarian regimes.

Historical context: how the “miracle weapon” idea began

A type of Hitler's "miracle weapon" - the German "V-2" (V-2), photo: Wikipedia

The term Wunderwaffe (literally, “wonder weapon”) became widely known during World War II through Nazi propaganda. But the idea of building myths around powerful weapons that could "solve everything" for a regime started much earlier.

Since ancient times, rulers have leaned on stories about supernatural power or divine weapons to boost their authority and scare enemies. In ancient Greece and Rome, tales of “invincible” phalanxes, advanced siege weapons, or divine backing were meant to raise morale and apply psychological pressure. In Carthage, war elephants served a similar purpose — symbols of power meant to terrify opponents before battle even began.

With modern technology, this idea of a “miracle weapon” became more tangible. In the 19th century, during the Industrial Revolution, European empires competed by showing off new guns, warships, and steam engines as proof of their technological edge. But it was in the 20th century that totalitarian regimes fully embraced the myth of the miracle weapon for political and psychological use.

For Hitler, the Wunderwaffe wasn’t a single invention, it was a collection of different systems supposedly able to turn the tide of war. These included the first ballistic missiles (V-1 and V-2), the massive V-3 gun, the first jet fighter (Me-262), the super-heavy tank Maus, and others. Interestingly, right up to the end of the war, the Allies believed Nazi Germany was focused on developing nuclear weapons. In reality, the German nuclear program was far behind the U.S. Manhattan Project. Most Nazi resources went into less ambitious, but heavily promoted, weapons, designed more for propaganda than battlefield use. Many of these systems were flawed, underfunded, or introduced too late to matter. Still, their psychological impact, both on the German public and on the Allies, was real. They helped create the illusion of a possible comeback, even when defeat was near.

The Soviet Union inherited and expanded the “miracle weapon” mindset during the Cold War, using it to deter the West and shore up support at home. One early example: the 1957 launch of Sputnik-1, which relied on the R-7 ICBM. This wasn’t just a tech achievement, it triggered panic in the U.S. and pushed the West to speed up its space and missile programs.

Soviet propaganda pushed hard to promote ICBMs like the R-16, SS-9 (Scarp), and R-36M as weapons capable of wiping out entire U.S. cities. Military parades on Red Square, showcasing these missiles, weren’t just for foreign audiences, they were staged to convince the Soviet public of the strength of socialism. In reality, these systems’ capabilities were often exaggerated, but their psychological impact was strong. A clear example is the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962: the U.S. backed down from a hard line in part due to the nuclear threat, even though the USSR actually had far fewer working missiles than it claimed.

Kremlin tactics: ICBMs as pressure tools

The Russian Yars complex, Photo: Defense Express

Today, Russia continues the Soviet tradition of using intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as a tool of political pressure, especially in the context of the war against Ukraine and its standoff with the West.

The RS-24 Yars missile system, in service since 2009, is a modernized version of the Topol-M. This three-stage solid-fuel missile can carry multiple individually guided nuclear warheads and has a range of over 10,000 km, putting almost any global target within reach. Still, as experts point out, missiles like Yars have limited practical use in the war with Ukraine. Their strategic range and a minimum launch distance of about 2,000 km make them unsuitable for nearby targets.

For the first time, Russia used the Oreshnik missile (a modified ICBM) to strike the Pivdenmash plant in Dnipro. It marked the first use of a strategic missile in a conventional war. The attack had more propaganda value than military effect, but it drew attention in Western media and fueled fears of escalation. According to Ukraine’s HUR, a second launch was planned for the night of May 19. It was supposed to be a "training and combat" launch of an RS-24 missile from the Yars system. But the launch never happened. Defense Express reports that technical problems were likely to blame.

"Why the Russians didn’t launch remains unclear. In 2023, Russia failed twice in a row to launch the RS-24 Yars — both went off course. … A malfunction during the first stage of flight, right after launch, isn’t out of the question. Even though Yars is a deep upgrade of the Topol, failures still happen. Let’s not forget that in late September 2024, the RS-28 Sarmat exploded in its launch silo at the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Russia," the outlet notes.

Notably, the first Oreshnik strike came just two weeks after Donald Trump won the U.S. election. It seemed designed to show Russia’s willingness to escalate and put pressure on Ukraine, the U.S., and their allies. Experts say this was a symbolic move to remind the world of the Kremlin’s power. That kind of nuclear posturing is typical for Russia during a U.S. administration change, one that Kremlin propagandists welcomed, since they believe Trump is open to deals. In this context, the Oreshnik strike looked like a “warning shot” for the incoming Trump team — Russia “rattling its sabers” before the administration even took office, to push for negotiations on Moscow’s terms.

The second launch attempt also “coincided” with the Kremlin’s political needs. It was scheduled just before a widely hyped phone call between Trump and Putin. Defense Express pointed out that the Kremlin didn’t want to “show the weakness of its nuclear deterrent forces” ahead of those talks, so the launch was delayed because “something went wrong.” If it had gone ahead, it would have served as another “letter from Putin to the world” — a reminder and a threat, showcasing a “miracle weapon” capable of striking anywhere, possibly with a nuclear payload.

In addition to external pressure, Russia's launches of ICBMs and other "new" missiles are also aimed at its domestic audience — to convince the public of the “power of Russian weapons.” This helps the Kremlin justify economic hardship, mobilization, and the country’s isolation, all while fueling patriotic feelings about an "invincible" Russia.

Military expert and head of the Council of Reservists of Ukraine’s Ground Forces, Ivan Tymochko, points out that using Yars and similar intercontinental missiles without nuclear warheads makes no real sense, but the fear they create can spread panic among civilians. In this way, such “wonder weapons” are just another tool of Russian propaganda meant to pressure Ukrainians from the inside.

“This is mostly for intimidation, targeting civilians, as long as the missile isn’t carrying a nuclear warhead. But a nuclear warhead changes everything — it’s a completely different kind of war, with completely different consequences, far more destruction. Still, Putin, who’s spent his life getting rich, just like his circle, won’t dare start a nuclear war. That’s clearly a one-way ticket. But for intimidation, or even a genocidal strike, they might use it. Either way, there will be reports, and if there’s even the slightest chance of an attack, people should immediately take cover,” he said on Ranok.LIVE.

Tymochko adds that a single ICBM costs around $50–100 million. For that price, Russia could build ten Kalibr missiles, which are more accurate and better suited to the Kremlin’s needs. Overall, experts agree that the effectiveness of this strategy is low. So, firing ICBMs without nuclear warheads is just more of the Kremlin’s typical scare tactics.

And Ukraine now has an answer to Russia’s weapons of mass destruction — long-range strike drones.

“Talk of Oreshnik is just a Russian psyop to scare Ukrainians. They don’t actually have that kind of weapon. It’s a dead-end line of development. … We know where Russia produces its liquid rocket fuel, and that’s extremely toxic stuff. Even Soviet manuals describe something called a conditionally lethal dose and an absolutely lethal dose. Russia has thousands of tons of this heptyl stored somewhere, and Ukraine — without using anything but good UAVs — can hit those sites. That would be scarier than Chernobyl. And they know we can do it,” said Mykola Stelmakh, former deputy commander of the RSD-10 “Pioneer” missile regiment and acting head of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament control unit at the Verification Center of the Armed Forces (1992–1995), on Espreso.

Not a unique tactic: similar examples of intimidation

KN-15 (Pukguksong-2) medium-range ballistic missile complex, DPRK, photo: open sources

The use of missile launches as a political tool isn’t unique to Russia. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes around the world use similar tactics to intimidate rivals, rally domestic support, and boost their standing on the global stage.

The most obvious example of this strategy is Russia’s close ally, North Korea. In fact, North Korea is one of the clearest cases of using missile launches for political pressure. Pyongyang regularly tests ballistic missiles to grab attention, scare its neighbors (including Japan and South Korea), and improve its bargaining position with the United States and others.

For instance, in November 2017, North Korea launched the Hwasong-15 ICBM, which Pyongyang claimed could reach anywhere in the United States. It wasn’t just a technical leap, it was a direct message to the Trump administration. Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that the DPRK uses missile tests as a "means of forcing negotiations on its terms." Sound familiar? Right after that launch, Trump and Kim Jong-un held their historic meeting in Singapore.

In 2022, the DPRK carried out a record-breaking 90+ missile launches, including the Hwasong-17, touted by Pyongyang as "the most powerful missile in the world." This wave of launches happened alongside rising tensions with the United States. According to American analysts, these moves are designed both to scare opponents and to fuel internal propaganda. At home, the launches boost Kim's cult of personality, distract from economic troubles, and promote the image of North Korea as a military powerhouse. Again, the parallels with the Russian Federation are hard to miss.

Another Russian ally with an authoritarian regime also regularly uses missile threats as part of its playbook. That would be Iran. Alongside its nuclear ambitions, Iran tests and launches ballistic missiles to pressure Israel and strengthen its position in nuclear talks with the U.S. For example, in 2020, Iran tested Shahab-3 and Qiam-1 ballistic missiles during military exercises in the Persian Gulf. These launches happened during heated nuclear negotiations and increasing U.S. sanctions. According to Farzin Nadimi, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, these tests were meant to show Iran’s ability to strike Israel and U.S. bases in the region, in other words, to deter retaliation. Inside Iran, the launches also help the regime shore up support, especially among conservatives. They help shift attention away from economic pain caused by sanctions and feed the narrative of "resistance to imperialism."

Another close Putin ally, Xi Jinping, also doesn’t shy away from using China’s missile arsenal to intimidate. China has occasionally staged high-profile launches and public displays of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, like the DF-41, to show off its military power and discourage the U.S. from stepping into regional conflicts, especially around Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. For instance, in 2019, during a military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing publicly showed off the DF-41 ICBM for the first time. It has a range of up to 15,000 km and can carry multiple nuclear warheads. In 2021, China tested a hypersonic missile that flew into low Earth orbit — something that caused real concern in the Pentagon. Experts say that launch sent a clear message: China is ready to push back against any attempt to contain its influence in the Pacific.

So, using missile launches as a political pressure tactic is a pretty standard feature of authoritarian regimes. These governments, just like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union before them, talk up their “miracle weapons” to scare their enemies and drum up domestic support. But the actual impact of this strategy often depends on the real capabilities of the weapon and the risk of escalation. In the end, the Wunderwaffe is more of a psychological tool than a game-changer in global conflicts. It’s been that way since the idea of the “miracle weapon” first came about.