EU to grant fund access only to those prioritizing European collective security

An international affairs expert and author of the Resurgam Telegram channel has analyzed this development, stressing its significance for global defense cooperation.

According to the Financial Times, weapons companies from the U.S., UK, and Turkey will be excluded from the EU’s new €150 billion defense funding program. The report highlights that at least 65% of production costs must be spent in the EU, Norway, or Ukraine to qualify for the funding.

The author believes this is a crucial shift that requires further explanation. He notes that third countries can only supply weapons under the European Rearmament Fund if they sign a collective security agreement with the EU. Such an agreement implicitly includes commitments to deter Moscow and support Ukraine, reinforcing the bloc’s strategic priorities.

The author stresses that this is the first time the EU has formally excluded the U.S. from such a defense funding mechanism. He recalls that during a previous attempt to establish a similar framework under PESCO, intense U.S. lobbying ultimately forced the EU to include American defense firms.

However, the EU still exercises flexibility in determining which countries align with its security framework, even beyond formal agreements. The author notes that the defense industries of Norway, South Korea, Japan, Albania, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Ukraine have already been included in the initiative, demonstrating that Brussels applies a case-by-case approach when integrating non-EU partners into its defense ecosystem.

The author of the Resurgam Telegram channel further elaborates on the implications for the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United States, highlighting the strategic choices each country faces in relation to the EU’s defense funding program.

For the United Kingdom, the author believes this development serves as an incentive to finalize its comprehensive defense agreement with the EU. The agreement was initially negotiated under the Conservative government and is expected to be completed after final talks with Germany, once Merz’s new government is formed. The author stresses that the UK’s inclusion in the fund is largely a technical matter of waiting, but also a subtle push for London to resist U.S. pressure—a scenario similar to what happened with PESCO, when American lobbying influenced the EU’s decisions.

Regarding Turkey, the author notes that Ankara has recently sought to position itself as an integral part of Europe’s new security architecture. This coincides with the final approval of the ReArm Europe Plan, which aims to inject hundreds of billions, potentially over a trillion euros, into the European defense sector over the next decade. The EU values Turkey as a strategic partner but remains cautious, emphasizing that formal commitments—not just diplomatic gestures—are necessary for deeper cooperation.

For the United States, the author points out that American defense stocks are likely to rise further, as White House policies have led Europe to shield its defense market from U.S. firms for the first time. However, the author suggests that the EU could soften these restrictions if Washington demonstrates greater commitment to European security. In essence, the EU is offering access to its rapidly expanding defense market—worth hundreds of billions of euros—in exchange for continued U.S. support for Ukraine.

The author also highlights a key provision in the funding framework:
 EU countries are allowed to spend up to 35% of loans on products containing components from Norway, South Korea, Japan, Albania, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Ukraine. Among all third countries, only Ukraine and Norway have the unique advantage of dual “fund utilization”, meaning they can benefit from the program in multiple ways—a notable distinction that underscores Ukraine’s growing integration into European defense structures.

On one hand, EU countries can support Ukraine without increasing national expenditures by using the rearmament fund. For example, Germany orders a tank for itself, its industry produces it (keeping Rheinmetall active), and then Germany has the right to transfer this tank to Ukraine. Essentially, the fund enables the transfer of weapons to Ukraine that were produced with its resources.

On the other hand, EU countries can order components or finished weapons from Ukraine, either for themselves or for direct transfer to Ukraine.