Battle for Kherson: repetition of battle for Zmiinyi on larger scale 

1. Russian forces and the importance of Kherson. The Kherson bridgehead is defended by the most capable forces of the Russian army. The group is commanded by the commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Mykhail Teplynskyi, and the 22nd Army Corps (Major-General Marzoev) is fully subordinate to him. Battalion tactical groups are recorded as part of the Russian group, consisting of:

7 and 76 Airborne Assault Divisions, 98th Airborne Division, 11, 31, 83 Airborne Assault Brigades, 45th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 90th Tank Division, 19th Motorized Rifle Division, 126th Coastal Brigade of Defense, the 810th Marine Corps Brigade, the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 10th Special Forces Brigade, operational units of the Roshvardiya. Almost all of the Russian Airborne Forces are concentrated here: three out of four divisions and all four brigades. Replenishment of personnel and military equipment is constantly transferred here.

2. Strategy. A series of defeats by the Russian forces in Ukraine has changed the plans of the Russian Armed Forces for the time being. Instead of capturing all of Ukraine, the Russian occupiers are now forced to focus on holding and capturing Donbas, on the defense of the land corridor to Crimea through the Zaporizhzhia region. But the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine began its offensive, and the advantageous bridgehead in Kherson turned into an anvil. Systematic strikes on bridges over the Dnipro narrowed the possibilities of supplying ammunition and support and limited the maneuverability of troops, which increased the effectiveness of reconnaissance and attack by high-precision weapons of the Armed Forces. The Russian Armed Forces cannot suppress Ukrainian artillery and missile systems. Defense is possible, but in such conditions, the Russians suffer unacceptable losses. Now the commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Surovikin is forced under the pressure of the Ukrainian army to plan the surrender of Kherson because he sees the inability of his elite troops to seize the initiative in the battle for Kherson. To protect themselves from defeat, the Russian forces plan to deploy a shortened line of defense along the Dnipro river. Because Kherson has become a trap, hundreds of times bigger than Zmiinyi, which absorbs reserves and which does not allow the Russian army to solve at least the tasks in Zaporizhzhia and Donbas.

3. Tactics. Russian troops have built a defense that is not dense, but is deeply echeloned defense, which is deployed along the landings, relies on the maneuver of artillery and aviation fire, the use of tactical reserves with armored vehicles. The goal of the Russian force is to prevent quick breakthroughs and consolidation of small Ukrainian combat groups. Landings in the Kherson region are rare, well visible, the intervals between them are large, 1.5-2 km. The first line of defense is the forward landing, dealing with small unarmored infantry forces that perform reconnaissance and surveillance functions, this line is mined both before and after landing. The main forces are concentrated on the second and third lines of landings, there are concentrated reconnaissance means, drones, tactical reserves, tanks and armored vehicles, a significant number of anti-tank missile systems, for which these are optimal conditions of use. Also, significant forces of Russian artillery and air defense equipment are concentrated on the bridgehead to support the troops, and aviation is used. The Russians do not hold the front edge. Therefore, an attack by small groups on a narrow front, the task of carrying out a raid, without coordination and interaction with artillery, in the calculation of advancing into the gaps in the battle formations, can lead to the stopping of the attack in the second, maximum third landing, pulling up tactical reserves, tanks to the place of the breakthrough, shelling with artillery. Attacks by small groups in separate areas and infiltration by infantry in this direction are ineffective. Offensive actions are effective when the enemy suffers significant losses, command posts, support artillery, and armored vehicles are destroyed, that is, the attack must be preceded by the softening of the defense over a large area. Otherwise, the attack requires completely different numbers and qualities of strike groups.

4. Will the Russian forces flee? The Russian command is doing everything possible to hold Kherson for as long as possible. However, if the powerful pressure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is maintained, or even increases due to the more effective planning of offensive operations, precise damage to the skeleton and nerve nodes of the Russian Air Force and the 22nd Corps, then the Russian command will begin to retreat. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are openly surrounding themselves to repeat the "gesture of goodwill" on Zmiinyi. The situation is very similar in tactical terms to the battle for the island. Russia has far from exhausted its resources for defense, but defense in such conditions causes significant losses, despite the fact that Kherson has lost its value as an offensive bridgehead in such conditions, and the withdrawal to the Dnipro will allow the construction of a line of defense here, withdrawing the Airborne Forces into reserve.

5. The importance of Kherson. The surrender of Kherson will mean Putin's inability to seize the initiative in the war even after full-scale mobilization. This will be a huge strategic defeat for Russia, and Ukraine's ability to defeat any powerful Russian group. But the battle is not yet over, the enemy is trying with all his might to delay, and at the slightest chance - to avoid defeat. The Ukrainian army will put an end to the battle and the liberation of Kherson.

About the author: Yuriy Butusov, Ukrainian journalist, war correspondent