Long before the European Commission plans to hand over the negotiation framework for Ukraine's accession to the EU (tentatively at the end of March 2024), the Tusk government de facto started bilateral negotiations with the Ukrainian government on the terms of Ukraine's EU membership in January this year (as soon as it came to power). However, it does not say this directly, although it is clear from the actions and comments of the Polish government
With each passing month of the sabbath that takes place on the border with Ukraine, this fact becomes more and more obvious.
Tusk's government has linked the issue of unblocking the border with the imposition of economic restrictions on Ukraine, especially in the agricultural sector. This is a classic protectionist policy of the stronger party to protect its own national interests at the expense of the weaker party.
''This is actually a real and pragmatic policy, which may seem incomprehensible to naive Ukrainians, whose perception of bilateral relations is limited to the abstract statement that "the Poles are our best friends". Yes, but Ukrainians have to pay for it.''
The Tusk government plans to expand the list of products banned by the PiS government. The current government is simply continuing the policy started by the previous government in 2023, hiding behind "protesters" led by the Confederation. We need to understand that if PiS were in power, the same thing would happen.
And this policy is bringing good results for Tusk's government. Since January 2024, his level of support has increased by 3% and today stands at 41%, while dissatisfaction with the government is 34% (this figure coincides with the level of support for PiS). Therefore, the Tusk government will continue to pursue protectionist policies, not only in the agricultural sector but also in other areas. It is possible that even in historical politics, if the same anti-systemic forces manage to form the loyalty of 70% of Polish society to this issue.
Interestingly, unlike in Ukraine, Polish society has no contradictions or sense of hypocrisy in the actions of its own government. Indeed, they remain overwhelmingly committed to solidarity with Ukraine, which, however, does not contradict Poland's right to non-parity conditions for the protection of national interests at the expense of Ukraine's interests. This dialectic of perception is due to the fact that Poles see these two issues not as mutually exclusive, but as parallel lines that do not intersect. For Ukrainians, they have a logical connection, while for Poles it is "nothing personal, just business".
''The aggravation of bilateral Ukrainian-Polish relations and Poland's hostile steps towards Ukraine since April 2023 are part of the rough road that Ukraine will travel on its way to EU membership. And this is just the beginning. And this is only with Poland. And then there will be no less difficult negotiations with Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and even Moldova (although this is a somewhat separate story).''
The difficulty here is not only in the long-standing problems of bilateral relations, but also in the lack of clear and understandable criteria for the EU's enlargement policy. According to Article 49, "any European State which respects the values set out in Article 2 and is committed to their furtherance may apply for membership in the Union". If you look at Article 2, you will find general wording about values: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. The applicant country must also meet the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria (1993). This is essentially the same thing, but more instrumental: the sustainable functioning of institutions for the functioning of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, the functioning of a market economy and the ability to guarantee compliance with the objectives of political, economic and monetary union. In fact, that is all.
In the Treaty on European Union, you will not find any more detailed information on what can and cannot be the subject of bilateral negotiations between EU member states and an applicant country. And practice shows that such a subject can be anything from obtaining economic benefits and concessions to changing the name of the country, rewriting the history textbook and demanding that it give up its own language.
''I wrote a separate post about this problem earlier, saying that the EU enlargement policy has turned into a flea market, where everyone is selling their own "national junk" and trying to sell it to you for a sky-high price. And the only way to avoid this is to ensure that the EU member state being negotiated with is adequate.''
Practice shows that with each subsequent wave of EU enlargement, especially after the largest one in 2004, when 10 new Central European members were admitted, including the three most problematic for future negotiations with Ukraine (Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia), the conditions of bilateral negotiations become more and more stringent and inadequate. And there is no point in appealing to Brussels - the European Commission is helpless here, as it simply has no powers at this stage. The maximum it can do is to act as a mediator in the negotiation process and appeal to reason. But this logic was understandable in the early stages of the European Economic Community (1957-1992) and in the first years of the European Union (1992-2003), as it was in line with the values and principles of the founding countries. However, the new EU members of the so-called "new Europe" have rewritten the rules over the past 20 years.
Therefore, we should fasten our seat belts and prepare for constant turbulence in relations with Ukraine's neighbours on its western borders.It will be rough. It is difficult to say how much Ukraine will have to compromise and give in today. But the price for membership will be high. The idea of the "United States of Europe" as envisioned by Jean Monet, Robert Schumann, Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli remained in the 1950s. Today is the 2020s, and the 2030s are likely to be no less challenging.
The European Union that Ukraine plans to join in the early 2030s will be far from what it was in 2013, when Ukrainians finally made their civilisational choice on the Maidan.
About the author. Taras Rad, election observation coordinator at the Civil Network OPORA.
The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.